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Incentivizing Innovation
XUAN-THAO NGUYEN*
JEFFREY A. MAINE*
Abstract
This Article advocates for a new approach to incentivizing innovation
through the design of ex post tax incentives for research and development
(R&D) investment. In contrast to many nations, the United States relies
largely on ex ante tax incentives, namely a tax deduction and tax credit for
qualified R&D spending. Fundamental design flaws exist with these ex ante
incentives; moreover, innovation occurs continuously and yields results at the
back end of the innovation cycle. An appropriate framework should take into
consideration the key players in the innovation landscape. These players are
often treated differently under the tax laws such that incentives for each may
be justified. This Article fills a void in the literature, which focuses mostly on
ex ante R&D tax incentives, and proposes several new ex post tax incentive
options for both corporations and individual inventors. Moreover, this Article redirects the renewed attention focusing on the proper role of government
in supporting risky R&D in response to pandemics and the race for future
vaccines.
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I. Introduction
In Attacking Innovation,' we forewarned of an innovation crisis in the
United States caused, in recent years, by a decline in direct government funding of basic research and a weakening of both the patent system and tax policy
tools used to encourage research and development (R&D). Shortly after we
called for changes in order to instill confidence in the R&D landscape, the
United States was hit with the coronavirus pandemic, the country's greatest
public health crisis in 100 years.

' Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Attacking Innovation, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1687

(2019).
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The government's initial response to the pandemic was to provide direct
economic assistance to various sectors of the economy impacted by the pandemic.2 In addition to delivering cash payments to Americans to prevent a
decline in spending, the government offered financial assistance to millions
of businesses which would have closed otherwise. The government also provided relief from taxation for these various forms of government assistance. 3
While many sectors of the health community were also provided resources
to contain and combat the virus, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies developing a COVID-19 vaccine candidate were largely ignored.
While the government provided necessary liquidity for a struggling economy,
it did not directly fund vaccine development on a wide scale as was seen in
other countries. 4 Indeed, Pfizer announced that it developed its COVID-19
vaccine with its own resources, not U.S. government financial support.'

2 See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020)
(providing resources to the health community to combat the virus and guaranteed paid sick leave
to employees affected by the pandemic); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) [hereinafter CARES Act] (providing economic assistance to many sectors of the economy).
s The CARES Act provided cash payments to many Americans (up to $1,200 for an eligible
individual plus $500 for a qualifying child). These economic impact payments were nontaxable as
they were really advanced refunds of a fully refundable tax credit. I.R.C. § 6428, as added by the
CARES Act, § 2201(a), 134 Stat. at 335-40. The CARES Act also expanded an SBA loan program to include forgivable loans made to help small businesses to pay necessary expenses and declared the amounts when forgiven as nontaxable. CARES Act, § 1106(i), 134 Star. at 301.
References to a "section" are to a section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
(Code), and the regulations thereunder, unless otherwise indicated.
4For a summary of countries' funding announcements, see Lisa Cornish, Funding COVID19 Vaccines: A Timeline, DEvEX (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.devex.com/news/funding-covid19-vaccines-a-timeline-97950 [https://perma.cc/YS6C-RVQV].
SSee Denise Grady, EarlyData Show Moderna's Coronavirus Vaccine Is 94.5% Effective
N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/health/Covid-moderna-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/FG26-FP2H] (noting that "Pfizer did not take any money from the
U.S. government to develop or test its vaccine" but that the United States "committed about $2.5
billion to help develop Moderna's vaccine and buy doses"); but see Neil Irwin, The PandemicIs
Showing Us How Capitalism Is Amazing, and Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2020),
[https://
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/14/upshot/coronavirus-capitalism-vaccine.html
perma.cc/GF7G-8592] (explaining that an "'advance purchase' agreement with the United States
government [ensured] it would be well compensated .... [Though the government did not direcdy fund the drug development, it created the groundwork in which the pharmaceutical company could spend research dollars with abandon, knowing that success would be financially rewarded."). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv. and Dept. of Defense,
U.S. Government Engages Pfizer to Produce Millions of Doses of COVID-19 Vaccine (July 22,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2310994/us-government-en2020),
[https://perma.cc/454M-6X8G]
gages-pfizer-to-produce-millions-of-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine/
(acknowledging that "Pfizer is collaborating with BioNTech, a German biotechnology company,
to develop COVID-19 investigational vaccines without U.S. government financial support").
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The government relied heavily on private investment in fighting the pandemic. Most notably, the government relied on the strong financial position
of big pharmaceutical companies themselves to fund critical R&D. It has
been suggested that the "deep pockets" of big pharma were a key to rapid
vaccine development. 6 "On average, pharmaceutical companies spend about
one-quarter of revenues on R&D."' In addition, the government relied on
charitable dollars from private donors to play a role. Philanthropic organizations, such as the Gates Foundation, and individual donors, such as Alibaba
founder Jack Ma and country music star Dolly Parton, all contributed to the
cause. 8

To say the government relied solely on private investment to fund vaccine
development would be misleading. Historically, the government has funded
some basic scientific research, conducted in government and university labs,
which may be relied upon by pharmaceutical companies in developing innovative drugs. 9 Indeed, the United States "has invested in basic scientific re-

' Irwin, supra note 5. These companies with deep pockets decided to risk the investment and
avoid government funding, believing the added bureaucracy would slow the development of the
vaccine. John LaMattina, Taxpayer Funded Research and the Covid-19 Vaccine, FORBEs
(Mar. 31, 2021, 3:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2021/03/31/taxpayerfunded-research-and-the-covid-19-vaccine/?sh=779c51961c42 [https://perma.cc/E95J-6GP5].
7 Erica York, CBO Report on R&D and Tax Policy in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, TAX
FOUND. (May 25, 2021), https://taxfoundation.org/pharmaceutical-industry-rd-spending/ [https:
//perma.cc/A38G-XW6H].
'Gates Foundation $1.75 billion (representing funding for vaccine R&D as well as vaccine
distribution); Jack Ma $14.4 million; Dolly Parton $1 million. Mark Suzman, Why We're Giving
$250 Million More to FightCOVID-19, GATES FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.gatesfoundation.org/ideas/articles/coronavirus-funding-additional-250-million-suzman [https://perma.cc/
CV6K-6WSP] (noting that the Gates Foundation's goal of "fair access to vaccines" inspired the
foundation's latest contribution); Laura He & Hanna Ziady, Jack Ma Donates $14 Million to
Develop Coronavirus Vaccine, CNN BUSINESS (Jan. 29,2020,12:03 PM), https://www.cnn.

[https://perma.cc/2GRUcom/2020/01/29/business/jack-ma-coronavirus-vaccine/index.html
KC4D]; Lucy Hooker & Daniele Palumbo, Covid Vaccines: Wil Drug Companies Make
Bumper Profits?, BBC NEws (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55170756
[https://perma.cc/W5UP-TB34]; Allie Clouse, Fact Check: Moderna Vaccine Funded by Government Spending with Notable Private Donation, USA TODAY (Nov. 24, 2020, 8:37 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/24/fact-check-donations-research-gra
nts-helped-fund-moderna-vaccine/6398486002/ [https://perma.cc/6ZEA-JVAL] (noting Parton's COVID-19 research fund was included on a list of supporters for the vaccine in The New

EnglandJournalofMedicine); see also Marissa Shapiro, VanderbiltResearchers Take Leadershp
Role in Covld-19 Vaccine Development, VANDERBILT UNIV. RESEARCH NEws (Dec. 18, 2020,
11:55 AM), https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2020/12/18/vanderbilt-researchers-take-leadership-rolein-covid-19-vaccine-development/ [https://perma.cc/3FAW-8693].
9 "The National Institutes of Health budget, devoted to medical research of all types, is [about
$40 billion a year]." Irwin, supra note 5.
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search" over the years "for a number of reasons[,] including defense, technology development, and health." 1" And these investments are crucial for generating "hypotheses for understanding the fundamental causes of disease or to
developing new technologies."" Thus, while Pfizer argues that it received no
financial support for the development of its vaccine, we cannot ignore the
fact that the U.S. government has invested in mRNA vaccine technology (via
the National Institutes of Health and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) that ultimately allowed companies like Pfizer and Moderna to
develop the vaccine as quickly as they did.' 2
In addition, the government occasionally subsidizes drug acquisitions,
which provides a market for drug makers. Indeed, in the recent COVID-19
pandemic, the United States purchased millions of doses of vaccines from
drug makers in "advance purchase" agreements. 3 So, while private industry
bore the costs to produce a vaccine that is cheap, highly effective, and available to everyone in the shortest time possible, the government contributed
funds, through Operation Warp Speed, to enable companies to build the capacity to produce millions of doses of their vaccines.' 4

10 LaMattina, supranote 6 (noting "for over 100 years, the U.S. has invested in basic scientific
research for a number of reasons including defense, technology development, and health").
' Id
1 See David E. Mitchell, Taxpayers Fund Research andDrug Companies Make a Fortune,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/24/opinion/coronavirus-vaccine-cost-pfizer-modema.html [https://perma.cc/NDK7-MUBE] ("Over the past several decades,
as private companies invested less in vaccines, the government, fearing a pandemic, took up the
slack. Scientific advances in mRNA vaccine technology that were funded by the National Institutes
of Health and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency enabled Pfizer and Moderna to
start working on a coronavirus vaccine as soon as the virus's genetic sequence was available."); see
also LaMattina, supra note 6 (crediting Pfizer and BioNTech for their foresight into the importance of mRNA vaccines all the way back to 2018).
3 For example, the United States agreed to purchase millions of doses from Pfizer in a $1.95
billion "advance purchase" agreement. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv.
and Dept. of Defense, supranote 5. After the Food and Drug Administration authorized the vaccine on December 11, 2020, the government agreed to purchase additional doses. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv. and Dept. of Defense, Trump Administration Purchases Additional 100 Million Doses of COVID-19 Investigational Vaccine from Pfizer (Dec. 23,
2020), https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2455698/trump-administration[https://perma.cc/99LB-QQW8];
purchases-additional-100-million-doses-of-covid-19-investi/
Irwin, supra note 5 (noting the $1.95 billion "advance purchase" agreement, ensuring Pfizer
"would be well compensated for eventually delivering 100 million doses of vaccine").
1LaMattina, supra note 6 ("Operation Warp Speed (OWS) contributed funds to enable
Moderna to build the capacity to produce its vaccine. Moderna is a small company and its Covid19 vaccine is its first product to make it to patients. Moderna didn't have anywhere near enough
capacity to build manufacturing plants. By helping to finance Moderna's efforts, as well as those
of Johnson & Johnson, Novavax, etc., the U.S. government helped to create the situation where
we will have over 600 million doses of Covid-19 vaccines by summer.").
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It is hard, however, to measure the impact of these forms of government
spending. The role that government-funded basic research actually plays in
technology development and health is unclear, as we have seen a dramatic
decline in government funding of basic research for quite some time.' 5 In the
1960s and 1970s, the government shouldered 70% of the funding for basic
research. 16 This amount was cut back to 61% as of 2004, and then again to
below 50% in 2013.17 In 2015, the government provided only 44% of the

total amount spent on basic research, or $38 billion." Again in 2017, the
number dropped to $34.9 billion.19 There are some hopeful signs, however,
that this decline in investment in pure forms of research may soon end. 20
In addition, the role that "advance purchase" agreements play in the development of drugs or vaccines is questionable. Indeed, the purchase agreement with Pfizer occurred only after Pfizer had already invested significantly
in R&D, 2 ' and it was one of many supply deals with a number of countries,
1 Corporate funding of fundamental scientific research is likewise in decline as there is no stock
market value in basic research. See Ashish Arora et al., Presentation at the Center for Innovation
Policy at Duke Law: The Decline of Research in Corporate R&D (Apr. 2, 2017), https://
law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cip/changing-innovationarora-and-belenzon-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6BTZ-E4X4] (describing corporate shift from fundamental research to applied
research).
1 Jeffrey Mervis, Data Check US. GovernmentShare ofBasicResearch FundingFallsBelow
50%, SCI. MAG. (Mar. 9, 2017, 1:15 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/data[https://perma.cc/M7SCcheck-us-government-share-basic-research-funding-falls-below-50
F2A8] ("The federal share, which topped 70% throughout the 1960s and '70s, stood at 61% as
recendy as 2004 before falling below 50% in 2013.").

17 Id
18 Id
' 9 Science News Staff, How Science Faresin the US. Budget Deal SCI. MAG. (May 1, 2017,
11:15 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/how-science-fares-us-budget-deal [https:
//perma.cc/ J9EC-27VD].
20 President Biden's infrastructure plan (the American Jobs Plan) would make significant contributions to R&D funding, expanding the mission of the National Science Foundation to indude
funding for technological innovation and authorizing large funding increases for NSF. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Plan (Mar. 31, 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-americanjobs-plan/ [https://perma.cc/3NS2-NJFK] ("calling on Congress to make smart investments in
research and development;" laying out a three-point plan for investing in R&D and the "technologies of the future" by investing $180 billion in researchers, laboratories, and universities across
the nation). See Dan Lips, Before In vestingMore in R&D, We Must Secure Research Institutions
form Outside Threats, THE DISPATCH (May 26, 2021), https://thedispatch.com/p/before-investing-billions-in-r-and [https://perma.cc/Q5QS-XG85]. See also David E. Sanger et al., Senate
Poised to Pass Huge Industrial Policy Bill to Counter China, N.Y. TMEs (June 7, 2021),
[https://
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/07/us/politics/senate-china-semiconductors.html

-perma.cc/9PJ7-QGDB].
21

Julia Kollewe, Pfizer and BioNTech Could Make $13bn From Coronavirus Vaccine, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/nov/10/
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including the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the European Union. 2
Furthermore, that financial incentive was itself contingent on the success of
Pfizer's research (i.e., receiving Emergency Use Authorization or licensure
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration).23
Aside from indirect spending measures, the government has in place two
long-standing public policy tools designed to incentivize private investment
in R&D. As an ex ante policy tool, the government provides firms an upfront tax incentive-either a tax deduction or tax credit-for qualified R&D
spending.24 In theory, these tax benefits lower the cost of R&D (and increase
the expected after-tax return on successful R&D), and firms respond by
spending more. Indeed, there is some data and economic research on the tax
credit's effectiveness in increasing research spending by private businesses.25
As an ex post policy tool, the government provides patent protection for innovative drugs. The government does not provide patent protection for basic
scientific research, which explains why private industry does not focus on
pfizer-and-biontech-could-make-13bn-from-coronavirus-vaccine [https://perma.cc/7R83-97EX]
(reporting that Pfizer spent $2 billion of its own money to develop the COVID-19 vaccine instead
of relying on public funding); Noah Weiland, Denise Grady & David E. Sanger, Pfizer Gets$1.95
Billion to Produce Coronavirus Vaccine by Year's End N.Y. TIMEs (July 22, 2020), https://
[https://perma.cc/
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/us/politics/pfizer-coronavirus-vaccine.html
8778-3PBZ] (reporting that after developing its version of the vaccine, Pfizer then would need to
conduct safety and efficacy trials before seeking regulatory approval).
2 Kollewe, supranote 21 (reporting that in addition to signing the advance purchase agreement
with the U.S. government, Pfizer agreed to supply the European Union with 200 million doses
and the UK with 40 million doses). Pfizer signed an agreement to supply 120 million doses to
Japan. See Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer and BioNTech to Supply Japan with 120 Million Doses of
their mRNA-Based Vaccine Candidate (July 31, 2020, 5:15 AM), https://www.pfizer.com/news/
press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-supply-japan-120-million-doses-their [https:
//perma.cc/3EQ7-782M];see also Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer and BioNTech to Supply Canada
with their BNT162 mRNA-Based Vaccine Candidate (Aug. 5, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.
pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-supply-canada-their-bntl6
2-mrna-based [https://perma.cc/54YA-4BHY].
2
3See Weiland, supranote 21 (noting that Pfizer's vaccine, if it could be developed successfully,
would need emergency approval). See alsoPizerSees Emergency Use Filingfor Govid-19 Vaccine
Afrer U.S. Election, CNBC (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/16/pfizer-says[https://perma.
could-apply-for-us-emergency-use-approval-for-vaccine-in-late-november.html
cc/V7NB-RTR4]; Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer and BioNTech to Submit Emergency Use Authorization Request Today to the U.S. FDA for COVID-19 Vaccine (Nov. 20, 2020, 6:45 AM),
https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-submit-emergency-use-authorization
[https://perma.cc/RF6D-RZ4C].
24
I.R.C. %§41, 174.
25
One study found that for every dollar of the credit, firms spend an additional dollar or more
on research. See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT:
CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS 19 (2015), https://fas.org/

sgp/crs/misc/RL31181.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B64-SJBX] (noting that public policy must supplement private investment in technological R&D).
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fundamental discoveries. But the government does grant a 20-year monopoly
to the drug companies that develop an innovative drug that relies on that
basic research. 26
These current policy tools (ex ante tax incentive to encourage new R&D
followed by expostpatent protection to reward successful R&D) are the bedrock for innovation in the United States. 2 7 And they are becoming increasingly significant in the wake of declining direct and indirect funding of R&D
by the government. Their role has become highlighted in the wake of the
recent coronavirus pandemic and in the debate about how to prepare for the
next health care crisis. What happens if, during the next epidemic or pandemic, relevant basic scientific research is nonexistent due to both a decline
in government funding of such research and a shift in corporate funding from
fundamental research to applied research? What happens next time if a few
big firms lack the multi-billion-dollar balance sheets and the deep pockets to
fund and protect their own research? Or, even if they do have deep pockets,
what if they choose not to fund research because the potential rewards fail to
justify the spending?
An enhanced patent system is not a likely government response in preparing for the next health crisis. The trend in recent years has been in the opposite direction-to weaken the patent system and "close the door on patent
inclusion." 28 Moreover, some commentators suggest that patent monopolies
might not even be justified in times of humanitarian crises and have called
for the sharing or pooling of know-how and other intellectual property in
such times. 29
2635 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
27

Erica York, CBO Report on R&D and Tax Policy in the PharmaceuticalIndusty, TAX
https://taxfoundation.org/pharmaceutical-industry-rd-spending/
(May 25, 2021),
FOUND.
[https://perma.cdN3JA-HFBK] (highlighting how taxes affect R&D investment incentives and
underscoring the importance of structuring the Code so that it is not biased against investment).
2s See Nguyen & Maine, supranote 1, at 1721.
29
See generallyEd Silverman, The WHO Iaunched a Voluntary Covid-19 Product Pool
What HappensNext., STAT (May 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/29/
who-covidl9-coronavirus-patents/ [https://perma.cc/JFG7-6RLN; William Worley, Covid-19
Puts a Spotlight on the Medicines PatentPool, DEvEX (June 22, 2020), https://www.devex.com/

46
1 [https://perma.cc/K7NBnews/covid-19-puts-a-spotlight-on-the-medicines-patent-pool-97
RP4M]; Niti Dewan & Ashima Sobti, Make PatentPools to Drown COVID-19, LEXOLOGY

(Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=15b50364-3e49-493a-84de-f6
3370204dee [https://perma.cc/E4VL4WM]; Bashar Malkawi, Patent Pools and the Pandemic-A Renewed Debate, THINK GLOBAL HEALTH (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.thinkglob[https://perma.cc/SQ9Malhealth.org/artide/patent-pools-and-pandemic-renewed-debate
HRT3] ("In light of COVID-19 we need to revisit patent pools and their potential for pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects."); David Lawder & Susan Heavey, U.S. Says It Will Push
Cowid Vaccine Waivers, But "May Take Time" REUTERS (June 10, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/us-raise-covid-19-vaccine-intellectual-property-issues-with-wto-may-take-time-2021-06-10/ [https://perma.ccX4EU-C8C6].
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Enhanced tax policy tools to incentivize new R&D, however, should be
seriously considered. As history has shown, the government modifies tax laws
often as they are important tools for shaping economic behavior.30 Whenever
Congress wants to stimulate the economy, encourage private investment in
distressed communities, or reward charitable giving, as just a few examples, it
enacts special tax incentives designed to achieve the desired economic outcome. Recent examples of economic or social engineering can be seen in Congress's immediate response to the coronavirus pandemic. In March 2020,

shortly after the pandemic hit the United States, Congress quickly passed
several tax law changes to inject liquidity into the economy. Most notably,
the economic impact payments that many Americans received were actually
in the form of refundable tax credits.31 Other tax law changes, seemingly enacted overnight, eliminated tax penalties for coronavirus-related distributions
and loans from retirement plans,3 2 modified tax rules governing discharged
loans used for payroll costs,33 suspended limitations on certain business deductions,34 and enacted refundable payroll tax credits for employers who retained employees." Congress even changed the charitable tax deduction rules
to encourage gifts to charity during the health crisis.36
A. The Role of Tax Policy in Incentivizing Innovation

Tax policy tools have several advantages. First, tax incentives for R&D can
be designed to be easily accessible by taxpayers. In many cases, a firm merely
needs to claim a particular tax benefit on the firm's annual tax return, and in
some cases submit a separate form. 37 There are few hurdles in claiming many
30 An ideal

tax system should be neutral and "avoid unnecessarily shaping economic behavior."

JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION: PROBLEMS

AND MATERIALS 5 (5th ed. 2018). But this neutrality principle has lost ground to what might be
termed "social engineering"-now a prominent feature of the current tax system. Id

31 I.R.C. § 6428, as added by the CARES Act, § 2201(a), 134 Stat. at 335-40.
32
CARES Act, § 2202, 134 Stat. at 340-43.
3 CARES Act, § 1106(i), 134 Stat. at 301.
4 I.R.C. %§ 172(b)(1)(D) (as added by the CARES Act, § 2303(b)(1), 134 Stat. at 353-54);
172(a)(1) (as amended by the CARES Act, § 2303(a)(1), 134 Stat. at 353); 461(0)(1) (as amended
by the CARES Act, § 2304(a), 134 Stat. at 356); 163(j)(10)(A)(i) (as added by the CARES Act,
§ 2306(a), 134 Stat. at 358-59).
4
3 CARES Act, § 2301, 134 Stat. at 3 7-51.
36
See I.R.C. § 62(a)(22) (as added by the CARES Act, § 2204(a), 134 Stat. at 345) (for 2020
only allowing an eligible individual to claim an above-the-line deduction of up to $300 for any
qualified contribution in response to the COVID-19 crisis); see also CARES Act, § 2205(a)(1),
134 Stat. at 345-46 (allowing an individual to deduct any qualified cash contribution made in
2020 as long as it does not exceed 100% of the individual's income).
37
To claim the section 41 research tax credit, IRS Form 6765, "Credit for Increasing Research
Activities," must be submitted along with the firm's annual tax filing. See I.R.M. 21.7.4.4.8.3.5;
Internal Revenue Serv., About Form 6765, Credit for Increasing Research Activities (2021),
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-6765 [https://perma.cc/8F6C-QQCA].
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tax breaks, which is not the case in receiving other forms of government support. Government grants, for instance, often involve convoluted grant applications, bureaucracy, and long timelines for grant review and award.38 And
patents are expensive, costing thousands of dollars and taking years to receive. 39

Second, because tax returns are not publicly available, R&D tax incentives
are largely invisible rewards for important research. This might be important
to some pharmaceutical companies that do not want to be seen as profiting
too much from drugs or vaccines, especially in the midst of a health crisis.
Even if a drug company sold its vaccine at a price that just covered its costs, 0
an R&D tax incentive, such as a tax credit, would still provide some financial
reward to the company unbeknownst to the public.
Third, tax incentives for R&D also provide the added benefit of certainty
for firms; a firm should know at the outset whether its R&D spending will
qualify for the benefit. Indeed, firms can take available tax incentives into
account when setting their annual research budgets and deciding on the research projects to undertake. In contrast, nothing is certain about grants or
patent applications.
A final benefit of R&D tax incentives is that they can be designed to benefit both small and large firms alike. In times of health crises, attention usually
focuses on the large R&D firms with deep pockets-the giants in the field
such as GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson (J&J).
As noted above, the U.S. government relied heavily on the deep pockets of
big pharmaceutical companies to fund COVID-19 vaccine development. But
this ignores the important role small biotechnology companies can play in
developing the underlying technology, and thus the important role of partnerships between such companies and larger pharmaceutical companies. Indeed, one lesson learned from the coronavirus pandemic is that the government must rely less on large drug manufacturers and look more to smaller

38

&

For some of the high risks of working under government contracts, see Kelly L. Warfield
M. Javad Aman, Role of Small Biotechnology Companies in the FledglingBiodefense Vaccine
Industry, TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1586/14760584.2016.1168702 [https://perma.cc/59SY-3X2W].
39
"According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the average time
it takes to get a patent is about 25 months." How Long andHowMuch to Get-a Parent?,MIuLER
[https://
IP LAW, https://milleripl.comlblogs/patents/how-long-does-it-take-to-get-a-patent
perma.cclFB9J-7W9A]. The cost is about $12,000-$14,000. Id.
40
Johnson & Johnson pledged to sell its vaccine at a price that just covers its costs. See Lucy

Hooker & Daniele Palumbo; Covid Vaccines: WillDrug CompaniesMake BunperProfts BBC
[https://perma.cc/
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55170756
Y7HG-Z2HD] (noting the same for the UK's AstraZeneca, which worked with a University of
Oxford-based biotech company).
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biotechnology companies to help develop vaccines.41 Appropriately designed
tax incentives can encourage more small and mid-size firms to work in this
space-an environment in which government funding is unreliable and private investors cannot anticipate a return on investment.42
One might make the argument that R&D tax incentives are inappropriate-specifically, that they reward spending that would have occurred even
without the tax break.43 This might be true for some R&D spending, for
example, R&D directed at producing huge profit-making medications that
require daily doses for common ailments and that are wanted by wealthy nations. But this is not true with respect to all R&D spending, especially R&D
spending on vaccine development, which can be a long, complex, and costly
process. Vaccine development differs from other drug development; with vaccine development, we cannot assume that the market will work. The truth is
that vaccine development, especially in the midst of a humanitarian crisis,
"hasn't proved very profitable in the past."" Profitability depends on a number of factors (e.g., production speed, how long immunity lasts, and how
many other vaccines are brought to the market).45 For Pfizer, the first to file
for approval of a COVID-19 vaccine, the profits were predicted to be shortlived. While sales potential existed for the first two years, long-term profits
were never expected to be dramatic. 46 Indeed in early 2021, just months after
its vaccine was approved, the value of Pfizer's shares fell amid questions about
the durability of the market for the vaccine.47
4
Jodi Xu Klein, Coronavirus:In Search for Vaccine, US Small Firms Take a Leading Role,
S. CHINA MORNING PosT (Apr. 21, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/world/
[https://
united-states-canada/article/3080789/coronavirus-search-vaccine-us-small-firms-take
perma.cc/ 8WJJ-2VVL].
42
Warfield & Aman, supla note 38. In one study, only 20% of small biotechnology companies
were primarily focused on vaccines, "which is not surprising given the long and complex development path for vaccines." Id.
43
See, e.g., David Hasen, Taxation and Innovation-A SectorialApproach, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1043 (arguing that special tax rules for innovation generally are inappropriate).
4 Hooker & Palumbo, supranote 40 ("The discovery process takes time and is far from certain.
Poorer nations need large supplies but can't afford high prices. And vaccines usually need to be
administered just once or twice.").
45
Id (noting that "[i]n two years' time, there could be 20 vaccines on the market").
46
Michael Gibney, PfizerMay Be 1st to Filefor COVID-19 Vaccine, But ProfitsLikely ShortLived, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/pfizer-may-be-1st-to-file-for-covid-9-vaccine-but-profits-likely-short-lived-61287896 [https://perma.cc/9KXL-U39W] ("Even though the
initial windfall from the respective COVID-19 vaccines is likely to be a shot in the arm for companies through 2021, the candidates are less likely to be the massive blockbusters these companies
are used to marketing.").
4 Riley Griffin, Pfizer Projects $15 Billion in 2021 Sales of Covid Vaccine, BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artides/2021-02-02/pfizer-forecasts-15-bil(Feb. 2, 2021),
lion-in-covid-vaccine-sales-for-2021 [https://perma.cc/D8N6-HBH5].
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The global community has recognized that "market incentives alone are
insufficient to produce an adequate supply of R&D, making it crucial for
governments to stimulate private R&D spending."48 So, too, has the United
States. According to the Treasury Department, the current R&D tax credit
was designed to address the underinvestment in R&D and to increase the
total amount of research activity undertaken in the United States.49 Why are
markets insufficient and why do firms underinvest in R&D? Through the
lens of economic theory, firms underinvest in R&D because they cannot capture all the benefits of their private investment due to the spillover effects of
research (i.e., the social returns to private spending greatly exceed the average
private returns). 5 This excess (the spillover effects or external benefits) takes
on the appearance of market failure; specifically, too few resources are being
spent on R&D. To remedy this market failure, the government must step in
to support R&D. In short, public policy must supplement private investment
in R&D.51
B. The AppropriateDesign ofR&D Tax Incentives
The question still remains, however, as to the appropriate design of R&D
tax incentives. A one-size-fits-all R&D tax break may not be warranted across
the innovation spectrum. And that is fine, as tax rules are malleable and can
be specifically crafted to target different taxpayers and specific spending.
R&D tax incentives can fall on the development side of innovation (ex ante
incentives), on the back end of the innovation cycle (ex post incentives), or
both. A combination of the two can be a powerful incentive to R&D. Unfortunately, in the United States, individual and corporate inventors have historically benefited from front-end tax incentives only-a tax deduction or tax

48

ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEv., TAX INCENTIVES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-

MENT: TRENDS AND ISSUES 7 (2002), http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/2498389.pdf [https://
perma.cc/325V-EXKH] [hereinafter OECD, TAX INCENTIvES].
49

OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN U.S. COMPETITIVENESS: THE BENEFITS OF ENHANCING THE RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION (R&E) TAX

CREDIT 1 (2011), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Investing-in-US-Competitiveness-201 1.pdf[https://perma.cc/BCE7-W8R5].
" See Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics ofTec/nologialInnovation, in THE POsITIVE SUM
STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC GROwTH 309 (Ralph Landau & Nathan

Rosenberg eds., 1986) (noting that social rates of return on technological innovation tend to be
higher than private rates of returns); Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuringthe Social
Return to R&D, 113 Q J. ECON. 1, 16 (1998) ("A number of studies in [the] literature purport
to find large rates of return to R&D, suggesting substantial underinvestment.").
51

See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT: CUR-

RENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS 1-2 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/

-

misc/RL3 1 18 1 .pdf [https://perma.cc/3B64-SJBX] (noting that public policy must supplement
private investment in technological R&D).
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credit for qualified R&D spending.52 Back-end tax incentives, in contrast, are
used less as a tax policy tool to incentivize or reward R&D. Indeed, corporations do not receive any ex post tax break (e.g., a reduced rate) on income
from successful R&D. 3 Individual inventors can qualify for an ex post tax
break, but qualification is often difficult due to flaws in the benefit's design. 54
In the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), Congress eliminated the
100% tax deduction for R&D for research expenditures after 2021 without

explanation." The change makes the United States an outlier internationally
and reduces its international competitiveness in R&D. 6 Moreover, the TCJA
failed to enhance the research tax credit, which some had predicted and argued was necessary to enhance its effectiveness. 57 Indeed, many companies,
including pharmaceutical companies, fail to take advantage of the credit either because they do not sufficiently understand its requirements or do not
have the necessary documentation to support credit claims. 58 In the wake of
the COVID-19 crisis, some have argued that Congress should enhance the

52

Tax deductions are historically justified as a means to tax only the net income of a taxpayer,
whereas tax credits are typically driven from political judgments to subsidize or encourage certain
activities. But today, both deductions and credits are used to deliberately drive economic decision
making and promote socially desirable activities.
5 Corporate taxable income is currently taxed at a flat 21% rate. I.R.C. § 11.
54
I.RC. § 1235 (providing capital-asset treatment to individual inventors in limited circumstances).
55

I.RC. § 17 4 (a), as amended by the TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13206(a), 131 Stat. 2054,

2111-13. Since 1954, the government has permitted 100% expensing for qualified R&D. Under
the TCJA, amounts paid or incurred for R&D after 2021 must be capitalized and amortized ratably over five years. The delayed effective date may signal that the change was more about meeting
the revenue goals of the TCJA than an actual change in policy. Whether Congress will act before
2022 to resurrect 100% deductibility of R&D expenses under section 174 remains to be seen.
Currently, bipartisan support appears to favor continuing 100% expensing. Doug Sword, Democrats May Resurrect Tax Breaks TCJA Targeted, 171 TAx NOTES FED. (TA) 1488 (May 31,
2021).
56
See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 1, at 1693; see also Alex Muresianu & Garrett Watson,
Reviewing the Federal Tax Treatment of Research & Development Expenses, TAX FOUND.
(Apr. 13, 2021), https://taxfoundation.org/research-and-development-tax/ [https://perma.cc/
5ZV3-HXT3].
57 The research tax credit is not available for many firms, and the credit's reformulation over
the years has limited the types of research for which it is available. In addition, the incremental
nature of the credit prevents many small innovators from using the credit. See Nguyen & Maine,
supra note 1, at 1734.
5
1 Capturing Pharmaceutical R&D Tax Credits: To FundNew Drug Discovery andDevelopment, CORP. TAX INCENTIVES (2016), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/432161/offers/phase2/
camp-nro_2/CTINRO2_PharmaceuticalRD.pdft=1476467594349 [https://perma.cc/7C5GGBNB]. One criticism of the credit is that it is complicated for firms to claim, and smaller firms
sometimes have difficulty accessing the credit. Muresianu & Watson, supra note 56.
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research tax credit.59 Professors Eyal-Cohen and Rutschman, for example,
propose purposeful ex ante tax subsidies for vaccine research that can com60
plement ex post intellectual property incentives for vaccine innovation.
They suggest, more specifically, combining tax and grant-like mechanisms in
the form of tax incentives for a predetermined list of qualified underfunded
diseases (i.e., tax credits refundable on a tiered basis for specifically designated
underfunded diseases).61
In contrast to proposals for enhanced ex ante R&D tax incentives, we explore in this Article the possibility of ex post tax subsidies for R&D to complement other ex postintellectual property and non-intellectual property incentives. Enhanced ex ante R&D tax incentives proposed by commentators
would be most effective if paired with a more competitive business tax system,
which includes ex post R&D tax incentives. 62 Currently, the government
does not provide ex post R&D tax incentives to corporate innovators and
provides a very limited ex post R&D tax incentive to individual inventors.
We explore here a change to these schemes and recommend several alternative
approaches.
To begin with, this Article accepts several premises. No attempt is made
here to debate the following, which have previously been vetted in the literature. First, R&D is important to economic growth and building national
wealth. 3 Second, government support of R&D is important." Third, government support for R&D can be provided not only directly (e.g., legal protections for intellectual property, grants, direct loans, and loan guarantees),
but also indirectly through tax incentives. Fourth, tax incentives for R&D
"See, e.g., Muresianu & Watson, supra note 56 (proposing that the credit be simplified to
ensure broad accessibility in order to make the U.S. more attractive for R&D investment).
6 Mirit Eyal-Cohen & Ana Santos Rutschman, Tax Policy and PharmaceuticalInnovation
30-44 (St. Louis U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-34, Nov. 20, 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3732567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.3732567 (proposing "ways by which the tax
system can be redesigned more effectively in the vaccine context than direct subsidies").

61 Id. at 33-34.
62

Muresianu & Watson, supra note 56 ("Making the R&D credit more generous is unlikely
to be an effective tool for greater R&D investment unless paired with a more competitive business
tax system.").

6 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Rachel Doud, TechnologicalInnovation, InternationalCompetition, and the Challenges ofInternationalIncome Taxation, 113 COLuM. L. REv. 347, 348
(2013) (noting that the importance of innovation to economic growth is "essentially uncontested
among economists") (citing Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production
Function, 39 REv. OF ECON. & STAT. 312, 320 (1957); Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals
ofAnitrust, Efficiency, Consumer Wefare, and TechnologicalProgress,62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020,
1026 (1987); Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 247, 253
(2007)).
" See Graetz & Doud, supra note 63, at 349 (noting that R&D "is underproduced in the
absence of government support") (citing Jones & Williams, supra note 50, at 1133; OECD, TAX
INCENTIVES, supranote 48, at 7; OFFICE OF TAX POucY, supra note 49, at 1).
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can fall within one of two categories-ex ante incentives and ex post incentives. Finally, because of design flaws in current ex ante R&D tax incentives,
expost R&D tax incentives should play an important role in R&D tax policy.6
In exploring options for ex post R&D tax incentives, however, consideration must be given to the key players in the R&D landscape. On the one
hand, enterprises play a vital role in facilitating innovations in the workplace,
innovations that lead to the procurement of patents and the development and
distribution of products in the marketplace. On the other hand, individual
inventors play a valuable role in generating ideas, experimenting, and perfecting the ideas that lead to patentable inventions and the development of patented products. Both enterprises and individual inventors are the two inseparable sides of the innovation space. These important, dual roles were evident
in the recent COVID-19 vaccination R&D efforts. The researchers at BioNTech and Pfizer perfected their efforts in developing the mRNA vaccines
while the corporate enterprises utilized their resources and expertise to conduct testing and obtain necessary regulatory approval in order to finally deliver the vaccines into the arms of the people. Part II of this Article examines
these distinct roles, as the tax laws often treat individuals and entities differently.
Part III focuses on corporate players in the R&D landscape. Because no ex
post R&D tax incentives are currently available to corporations, Part III explores several options. One possibility is a complete exemption from taxation
of intellectual property income. Another is a low effective tax rate applicable
to intellectual property income. A third option is postponement, or deferral,
of taxation of intellectual property income. While the first two options would
face substantial hurdles, the third-deferral of taxation of profits from successful R&D if such profits are reinvested in specifically defined categories of
underfunded research-is worthy of serious consideration. Part IV of the Article shifts focus to individual inventors, who play more of a silent role in the
R&D landscape. This Part explores the limited ex post tax reward for R&D
currently available to certain individual inventors and recommends several
changes to enhance the tax benefit. Specifically, Part IV recommends expanding the group of taxpayers eligible for the benefit and adding three additional
patent transfers to the list of eligible transactions that qualify.

65

For criticisms of current ex ante R&D tax incentives (i.e., the R&D tax deduction and the
R&D tax credit), see Nguyen & Maine, supranote 1, at 1736.
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II. The Important Roles of Corporations and Individuals in R&D
A. Corporate 'Inventors"andDevelopers
In the United States, corporations cannot be inventors under patent law.
The Supreme Court in Stanford v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. emphasized that patents can only be issued to individual inventors.66 Generally, the
67
named inventors on patents are presumed to be the true and only inventors.
Nevertheless, enterprise entities exist as the creators of inventions because
they recruit and hire researchers, scientists, and other talent to invent. In turn,
their inventor-employees are obliged to assign patents and other intellectual
property to the enterprises in accordance with their employment agreements. 68 Routinely, individual inventors' employers file the patent application and spend resources to prosecute the application.69 At the end of the
prosecution period, if the USPTO grants the patents, the USPTO lists the
employer enterprises, not the inventor-employees, as the assignees. Annually,
the list of companies with the most patents obtained generates the bragging
rights and prestige of being leaders in innovation. 70 Patents are often viewed
"563 U.S. 776 (2011).
67

Se Drone Tech. v. Parrott SA, 838 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
6 See IBM Tops US PatentList for 28th Consecutive Year with Quantum Computing AI,
Hybrid Cloud Innovations, HPC WIRE (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.hpcwire.com/off-thewire/ibm-tops-us-patent-list-for-28th-consecutive-year-with-quantum-computing-ai-hybrid-clou
d-innovations/ [https://perma.cc/MMU2-XJBU] ("IBM scientists and researchers received 9,130
U.S. patents in 2020, the most of any company, marking 28 consecutive years of IBM patent
leadership. IBM led the industry in the number of artificial intelligence (AI), cloud, quantum computing and security-related patents granted."). Moreover, 8,500 IBM inventors reside in 47 states
and territories and 47 countries, contributing to IBM's patent procurements and leadership. See
IBM Inventors Receive Record-Breaking 8,000+ US. Patents in 2016, PR NEWSWIRE
(Jan. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ibm-inventors-receive-record-breaking-8000-us-patents-in-2016-300387665.html [https://perma.cc/TE6V-T3Q3].
69
See Filing by Other Than Inventor, 35 U.S.C. 118 ("A person to whom the inventor has
assigned or is under an obligation to assign the invention may make an application for patent. A
person who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter may make an application
for patent on behalf of and as agent for the inventor on proof of the pertinent facts and a showing
that such action is appropriate to preserve the rights of the parties. If the Director grants a patent
on an application filed under this section by a person other than the inventor, the patent shall be
granted to the real party in interest and upon such notice to the inventor as the Director considers
to be sufficient.").
70 Gene Quinn, With 9,043 U.S. Patents, IBM Tops for 25th Consecutive Year, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/09/ibm-tops-u-s-patent-list/id=
92016/ [https://perma.cc/M5KG-XUUZ]; Companies With Most Patents:Everything You Need
to Know, UPCOuNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/companies-with-most-patents [https://
perma.cc/TPN8-U45J]; Prableen Bajpai, Patent Dominance: Top 5 Companies Leading the
Charge, NASDAQ (Jan. 17, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/artides/patent-dominance%3A-top-5-companies-leading-the-charge-2020-01-17.
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as the reward for devoting significant investment dollars in R&D by companies. 71 The number of patents granted also represents the fact that these enterprises have cultivated a corporate culture and provided conditions conducive for innovation and the creation of intellectual property.72
In startups, founders and employees work tirelessly to reach milestones in
order to obtain necessary funding to scale to the next stage.73 Startups burn
cash because they compete at a breakneck pace of innovation to develop their
products or services to capture the market. 74 The intellectual property creation and ownership distinguish each startup from the others. 75 In more than
7

Robert Hackett, These Tech Companies Scored the Most Patents in 2014, FORTUNE
(Feb. 24, 2015, 3:20 AM),
https://fortune.com/2015/02/24/most-patents-companies-2014/
[https://perma.cc/3PRZ-ZPBS] ("Patents are the lifeblood of the tech industry-and if last year's
numbers are any indication, that sector is performing with vigor. More than 300,000 utility patents-those are the ones for inventions, rather than designs-were issued by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office last year, a record high. Such patents allow companies to put their
inventions on lockdown for up to two decades, reaping rewards for significant R&D investments.").
72

See, e.g., Steven Overly, HowFordTurned Thousands ofEmployees into Inventors, WASH.
PosT (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/12/14/
[https://perma.cc/D493-6WVP];
how-ford-turned-thousands-of-employees-into-inventors/
Keith Shaw, AI ResearchAmong Record 9,100 Patentsfor IBM in 2018, ROBOTIcs BUS. REv.
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/ai/ai-research-among-record-9100-patents-for-ibm-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/6T6P-U7T5] ("Ingrained in the company's culture,
IBM patents were awarded to employee inventors across 48 countries worldwide last year."); Louis
Columbus, The Most Innovative Tech Companies Based on ParentAnaydes,FORBEs (Dec. 15,
2019, 11:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2019/12/15/the-most-innova[https://perma.cc/53EMtive-tech-companies-based-on-patent-analytics/?sh=3a65e8ca62ce

UP73].
73

Serting Key Milestones in Startup Fundraising: From Seed to Series B, SEEDRS,
https://www.seedrs.com/academy/setting-key-milestones-in-startup-fundraising-from-seed-to-series-b/ [https://perma.cc/8QSL-67X9]; Tick Off These Meaningl 1i5MilestonesFor Your Early
Startup Stage, ALcOR (Jan. 14, 2021), https://alcorfund.com/insight/tick-off-these-meaningful15-milestones-for-your-early-startup-stage/ [https://perma.cc/73FX-6L3P]; Zenas Block & Ian C.
MacMillan, Milestones for Successful Venture Planning, HARV. BUs. REV. (1985), https://
hbr.org/1985/09/milestones-for-successful-venture-planning [https://perma.cc/9D4R-KMJC].
74
Brad Stone, HowMuch CashAre On DemandforStartups Burning, ECON. TIMEs (Apr. 2,
2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/how-much-cash-are[https://perma.cc/AD6Jon-demand-startups-burning/artideshow/68681480.cms?from=mdr
P47C]; Lewis Hower, Understanding What Your Sartups's Burn Rate Really Means, SVB,
[https://perma.cc/X2HZhttps://www.svb.com/blogs/lewis-hower/startup-burn-rate-cash-flow
SMY3]; Chris Read, 2018 Startup Cash Burn Report: A Benchmarking Spend BREx (Dec. 6,
2018), https://www.brex.com/blog/burn-rates/ [https://perma.cc/W9E2-TTUG].
75
Efrat Kasznik, Examining the Correlation Between IP and Startup Valuation, BVR
(Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.bvresources.com/blogs/intellectual-property-news/2020/02/24/ex[https://perma.cc/QC7X-CDFM];
amining-the-correlation-between-ip-and-startup-valuations
Richard Harroch, 10 Intellectual PropertyStrategies for Technology Startups, FORBES (June 6,
2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2017/06/06/10-intellectual-property-
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30 innovation centers across the United States, vibrant startups collaborate
and compete against one another, shaping, challenging, and realizing impossible dreams.' Startup failures and successes produce ideas and knowledge
fueling the next layer of collective knowledge enjoyed by all."
Established companies either acquire startups for their new technologies
78
or enter into technology licensing deals with startups. From Microsoft to
Facebook, from Google to Apple, from Amazon to eBay (among others), acquisitions of startups are among key corporate transactions that allow big
79
companies to survive and thrive in the marketplace. Simply put, legacy
companies often prove too big and too ingrained in their own rhythm in
order to continue the dynamic innovations that constandy demand new ideas
strategies-for-technology-startups/?sh=37eede8dablb

[https://perma.cc/K4Q5-8PQU]; Efrat

Kasznik, Intellectual Property Value in Startup Investments: A View from Silicon Valley, IPEG
(Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.ipeg.com/intefectual-property-value-in-startup-investments-a-viewfrom-silicon-valley/ [https://perma.cc/R2HR-JWL4].
76
See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Banking the UnbankedInnovators, 45 J. CORP. L. 715, 720 n.33
(2020) (discussing innovation centers in the United States where funding ecosystems are available
for startups).

7 SeegenerallySifanLiu & Joseph Parilla, How Startups Help CitiesMeasure TheirEconomic
Development Frontier, BROOKINGs (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-

[https://perma.cc/CH8Qstartups-help-cities-measure-their-economic-development-frontier/
6QMV]; How Sartups ContributeDuringCOVID-19-Meerthe GermanAccelerator Companies That Share Knowledge, Valuable Resourcesand Help Lighten OurMood, GERMAN ACCELERATOR (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.germanaccelerator.com/blog/how-startups-contribute-during-covid-19-meet-the-german-accelerator-companies-that-share-knowledge-valuable-resourcesand-help-lighten-our-mood-pt-2/ [https://perma.cc/RU2Y-FCZZ); Jouni A. Laitinen & Dai Senoo, Knowledge Sharingin Young Starups-FirstQuantitativeSteps; 12 J. SERv. SCI. & MGMT.

495-520 (2019); John Wu & Robert D. Atkinson, How Technology-Based Starr-UpsSupport
U.S. Economic Growth, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://itif.org/
publications/2017/11/28/how-technology-based-start-ups-support-us-economic-growth

[https://

perma.cc/R82N-JHL3].
7
Scott Carey, Biggest TechnologyAcquisitions of2020, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 15, 2020,
4:08 AM),

https://www.computerworld.com/artide/3513439/biggest-technology-acquisitions-

of-2020.html [https://perma.cc/ZA3J-2AFY].
79 Chris Alcantara et al., How Big Tech Got So Big Hundreds ofAcquisidons, WASH. POST
(Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2021/amazon-applefacebook-google-acquisitions/ [https://perma.cc/U2A4-TV8G] (reporting that Amazon, Apple,
Facebook and Google "acquired hundreds of companies over decades to propel them to become
some of the most powerful tech behemoths in the world"); Kif Leswing, HowApple DoesM&A:

Small and Quiet, With No Bankers, CNBC (May 1, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/
[https://perma.cc/XG4905/01/how-apple-does-ma-small-and-quiet-with-no-bankers.html
9AF7] (stating that Apple purchased 100 companies in the past six years or a company every three
or four weeks); Acquisitions by eBay, TRAcXN (Oct. 29, 2020), https://tracxn.com/d/acquisitions/acquisitionsbyEBay [https://perma.cc/3AAA-B7MS]; Debasish Sarkar, Why Tech Businesses Are Eyeing Business Growth Through Startup Acquisition?, INC 42 (May 31, 2020),
https://inc42.com/resources/tech-companies-unlock-business-growth-through-startup-acquisi-

tion/ [https://perma.cc/NG3P-EWWY].
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and present threats to a self-imposed sense of comfort. 80 Fear of oblivion
keeps enterprises innovative and surviving,81 often through technologies obtained from others for subsequent incorporation into their own R&D in the
hope of closing the gap between the legacy enterprises and their rivals.S 2
In the biotech industry, companies participate in licensing deals with others for their technologies and products with the desire to augment their R&D
and to expand product lines.83 In many instances, established companies rely
on startups for the missing, early-stage innovations. For example, large
pharma companies obtain the drug candidates and associated technologies
from small biotech companies after Phase II of the drug development cycle.84
That means the small biotech companies focus on preclinical and Phases I
and II discovery before big biotech companies devote their resources to the
subsequent clinical studies and regulatory approval process.85 Small biotech
8

See Solon Moreira, Thomas Maximilian Klueter & Stefano Tasselli, When Licensing New
Tech Is Better Than Building It In-House, HARv. Bus. REV. (June 30, 2020), https://hbr.org/
2020/06/when-licensing-new-tech-is-better-than-building-it-in-house [https://perma.cc/TXW65REN] (noting that some companies "drew on external knowledge by entering into strategic alliances and collaborating with outside partners" to catch up R&D).
81
Isobel Asher Hamilton, As Amazon CEO, JeffBezos Was Obsessed with Amazon's "Inevitable"Death, Bus. INSIDER (July 5, 2021, 5:35 AM), https://www.businessinsider.comljeff-bezoskeeps-talking-about-amazons-inevitable-death-2018-12 [https://perma.cc/4NFK-Z2LZ]; Brad
Stone, The Jeff Bezos Paradox, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
07/03/opinion/jeff-bezos-space-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/696S-NP75] (describing Jeff Bezos's fear of Amazon becoming a "'Day 2' company" because "Day 2 is stasis, followed by irrelevance, followed by excruciating, painful decline, followed by death.. .. And that is why it is always
Day 1"). Amazon acquired a number of companies to supplement its R&D and expand. See Amazon's MajorAcquisitions Over the Years, REUTERS (May 26, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/
technology/amazons-major-acquisitions-over-years-2021-05-26/
[https://perma.cc/8VXMA4R8]; Alison Durkee, Amazon's BiggestAcquisitionsHave Allowed It to Become a Marketplace
for NearlyEverything, FoRBEs (May 24, 2021, 9:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2021/05/24/amazon-biggest-acquisitions-have-allowed-it-to-become-a-marketplace-for-n

early-everything-mgm-deal/?sh=61ad77b36354 [https://perma.cc/9SPU-T6YK].
"See Moreira et al., supra note 80 (stating that "[m]ost companies fear competition from a
rival's product innovations and the risk of falling behind their industry's technological frontier"
and identifying three approaches to how companies close the distance between them and competitors in the innovation space).
3
1 Phil Taylor, The Top 15 BiopharmaLicensing Deals of2020, FIERCE BIOTECH (Apr. 27,
2021, 3:00 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/special-report/top-l5-biopharma-licensingdeals-2020 [https://perma.cc/WZ6A-BV22].
' Shiva Khalafpour, SupporingDrug ProductInnovation Through Small Biotech Companies, DRUG DISC. & DEv. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.drugdiscoverytrends.com/supportingdrug-product-innovation-through-small-biotech-companies/ [https://perma.cc/2CHQ-XT9B].
85 See Emily Henderson, Small Biotech Companiesjoin with PharmaceuticalGiants to Manufacture Drugs, NEWS MED. LIFE SCI. (June 30, 2021), https://www.news-medical.net/news/
20210 6 30/Small-biotech-companies-join-with-pharmaceutical-giants-to-manufacture-drugs.aspx
[https://perma.cc/L7BJ-A7Y8] (reporting that "tiny biotech Cassava Sciences has teamed up with
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companies, lacking size in commercialization and expertise to navigate
through complex regulatory processes, may team up with partners in contract
development and manufacturing organizations for opportunities to bring
products to market.86 Other small biotech companies with venture capital
backing might take a different and bolder step; the small biotech companies
develop their treatments and products through commercialization in a particular niche. 87
In the biopharma ecosystem, contrary to the perception of innovation at
large enterprises, studies demonstrate that big pharma companies actually do
88
not engage all in-house drug development innovation. For instance, only
23% of Pfizer products are in-house and 11% of J&J products are developed
by their own scientists. 89 The majority of Pfizer products are originated or
developed by other companies. Pfizer's highest selling product, Prevnar 13
vaccine for pneumococcal disease, is the direct result of Pfizer's purchase of
Wyeth in 2009.90 Similarly, Pfizer acquired from Warner-Lambert and Onyx
Pharmaceuticals the drug palbociclib (Ibrance). Likewise, J&J's top product,
infliximab (Remicade) comes from the monoclonal antibody synthesized by
Centocor.91
Moreover, with respect to the COVID-19 vaccine development, the collaboration between Pfizer and BioNTech illustrates the current biopharma
ecosystem. BioNTech is a young biotech company founded in 2008, having
92
a narrow focus on developing mRNA vaccines. As a new and small enter-

the giant Evonik Industries to make an experimental Alzheimer's treatment for phase 3 clinical
trials and, possibly, later commercialization").
" See Khalafpour, supra note 84; PharmaceuticalCDMOS, TAPEMARK (2021), https://
www.tapemark.com/pharmaceutical-cdmos [https://perma.cc/ZG2C-TWPG] (explaining the
CDMO ecosystem); see also Samsung Biologics, ConractDevelopment & Manufacturingin

Pharmaceuticals:The Diference Between Good & Great, FIERCEPHAMA (July 20, 2020, 10:30
AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/sponsored/insider-principles-key-criteria-to-consider-when

-selecting-right-cdmo [https://perma.cc/BAQ7-DAA8]; 403 Biotech Contract Manufacturing
Companies-Worldwide, BIOPHARM Guy, https://biopharmguy.com/links/company-by-loca-

tion-contract-manufacturing.php [https://perma.cc/LC9Q-C7EQJ.
87
See Khalafpour, supranote 84. See also Alex Phillippidis, 20 Top VC Firmsfor Biotech,
GENETIC ENG'G & BIOTECH. NEws (Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.genengnews.com/a-lists/20top-vc-firms-for-biotechs/ [https://perma.cc/L5WV-Q8RY].
88 See Emily H. Jung, Alfred Engelberg & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Do Lage Pharma Companies

Provide Drug Development Innovation? OurAnalysis Says No, STATNEWS (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/12/10/large-pharma-companies-provide-little-new-drug-devel[https://perma.cc/5XNS-3UMP).
opment-innovation/
8
9

See id

99 1Id

d

92

Two scientists, a husband-and-wife team, founded BioNTech in 2008. See David Gelles,

The Husband-and-Wife Team Behind the Leading Vaccine to Solve Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES
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prise, BioNTech holds no track record of success in its efforts to develop vaccines." BioNTech, nevertheless, possesses expertise in mRNA vaccine development. Additionally, in August 2018, the company entered into a multiyear R&D agreement with Pfizer to develop mRNA-based flu vaccines.94
When the COVID-19 virus hit Wuhan, China, and spread to other countries, BioNTech raced into action under "Project Lightspeed" in January
2020.95 Two months later, BioNTech and Pfizer capitalized on their collaboration and devoted their efforts to mRNA vaccine development for
COVID-19, as announced to the world in March 2020.9 BioNTech and
Pfizer complemented each other to accelerate the development of the vaccine
for the benefit of all.
In summary, big pharma conducts in-house drug development and testing
and acquires drugs in preclinical studies from other enterprises. 97 The same
approach is also common in big tech. Moreover, innovation occurs at all
stages of the R&D process. An understanding of the process of innovation at
small and large enterprises in the tech, pharma, and other sectors is necessary
if tax policy is to be used effectively as a tool to incentivize innovation.

(Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com]2020/11/10/business/biontech-covid-vaccine.html
[https://perma.cc/4GKZ-6XD6]. Two years before the pandemic, the BioNTech founder stated
at a conference of infectious disease experts that "his company might be able to use its so-called
messenger RNA technology to rapidly develop a vaccine in the event of a global pandemic." Id
93

Id

See Press Release, BioNTech, BioNTech Signs Collaboration Agreement with Pfizer to Develop mRNA-based Vaccines for Prevention of Influenza (Aug. 16, 2018), https://biontechse.gcsweb.com/news-releases/news-release-details/biontech-signs-collaboration-agreement-pfizer-develop-mrna-based [https://perma.cc/L8MJ-E7WT].
95
Project Lihtspeed, BIONTECH, https://biontech.de/covid-19-portal/project-lfghtspeed
[https://perma.cc/WTE3-DCLP].
9 See Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer and BioNTech to Co-Develop Potential COVID-19 Vaccine
(Mar. 17, 2020, 2:00 AM), https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizerand-biontech-co-develop-potential-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.ccIU5FL-RRE5]. The Press
Release states that both companies agreed to a letter of intent regarding the co-development and
distribution of
9

a potential mRNA-based coronavirus vaccine aimed at preventing COVID-19 infection.. .. The collaboration aims to accelerate development of BioNTech's potential firstin-class COVID-19 mRNA vaccine program, BNT162, which is expected to enter clinical testing by the end of April 2020. The rapid advancement of this collaboration builds
on the research and development collaboration into which Pfizer and BioNTech entered
in 2018 to develop mRNA-based vaccines for prevention of influenza.

Id
97

Jung et al., supra note 88 (explaining that preclinical studies are "the basic and translational
science that is the foundation for the discovery of innovative drugs").
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B. IndividualInnovators

Individual innovators are the brain ushering companies into competition
98
space, sustaining the gruesome pace, and capturing the unimaginable.
Simply put, without the talented individuals in tech, pharma, and other sectors, there will be little to no economic growth and innovation in a particular
city, nation, or continent. "9

Talented employees at companies collaborate and innovate. As companies
cultivate a culture that truly fosters creative thinking and values innovation,
they must attract and retain talented individuals. Illustratively, among the top
50 companies recognized as "best workplaces for innovators," the freebies of
great snacks and a generous leave policy prove not to be the key determinants. 100 Instead, "offering people time to pursue bold projects (both within
and outside their main jobs)," "configuring work spaces" for greater collaboration across teams, placing "premiums on inclusivity," and "giving people
room to fail" are among the main drivers that propel innovations in the workplace.101 The list of best workplaces includes some familiar and not very familiar names, including 3M, Activision Blizzard, Amazon, AMD, Ansys,
Chobani, Compass, Kronos, Procter & Gamble, Reverb, Sephora, Sonatype,
Workday, Thorn, and Xinova." 2
Through collaboration and experimentation, innovators become inventors
when their employers file for and subsequently obtain patents. Whether the
inventors work at the "Top 50 Best Workplaces for Innovators" or other
companies in the United States, the inventors generally do not receive a share
in the profit generated from the patents. The rationale for the lack of profitsharing from patents is that the employer already has provided its employees
98
Davis Carlin et al., Building the Tech Talent Pipeline, McKINSEY & Co. (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/building-the-tech-talent-pipeline# [https://perma.cc/9HM2-96ZA] ("if technology is now the growth engine for business, tech talent and the institutions that produce it are the fuel").
99
The scarcity of talented tech workers has now become a global problem as national and continental economies increasingly depend on the availability of tech workers. Pedro Nicolaci da

Costa, Tech Talent Scramble: Global Competition for a Limited Poolof Technology Workers Is
Heating Up, INT'L MONETARY FUND FIN. & DEv. (Mar. 2019), https://www.imforg/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/03/global-competition-for-technology-workers-costa.htm#.XhuSQb3Y
s.twitter. Regionally, cities in the United States identify ways in which to attract talented workers.
See, eg., Technology, Talent, and Tolerance:Attacting the Best andBrightestto Memphs, MEMPHIS TALENT MAGNET PROJECT, https://www.networksnorthwest.org/userfiles/filemanager/11

69/ [https://perma.cc/ NUZ5-9DRD].
100 The 50 Best Workplaces for Innovators, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/best-workplaces-for-innovators/2019 [https://perma.cc/FWN4-78SZ] (discussing
the study conducted between Fast Company and Accenture to identify the best workplaces for
innovators).
101 Id
102

Id
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with the facilities and work environments, in addition to salary and benefits,
conducive to innovation. The U.S. approach with respect to the absence of
profit-sharing between employers and inventor-employees is similar to that
in other Western countries.103 Consequently, lawsuits demanding a share of
the profits from patents brought by employee-inventors against their employers are extraordinarily rare. 104 Likewise, few companies implement special
programs rewarding their employee-inventors.' 05
Contrary to U.S. practice, China, a nation with more international patent
filings than the United States in recent years,106 embraces a different approach
to employee-inventors and special compensation. Under Chinese law, when
employees invent under the scope of employment or use mainly the materials
and facilities of the employer, the employer must provide the employee-inventor with reasonable remuneration in accordance with the economic results
achieved in association with the invention. 107 The remuneration should not
be less than two percent of the annual operating profit generated through the

103See Phillip Broadwith, You Don't Own Me, CHEMISTRY WORLD (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.chemistryworld.com/opinion/when-should-employees-share-profits-from-inventions/4010944.artide [https://perma.cc/5RXZ-BAPZ]. See also William P. Hovell, Patent Ownership:An Employer's Rights to His Employee's Invention, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 863 (1983).
104 Broadwith, supra note 103 (discussing the litigation brought by Ian Shanks against Unilever
for his research that led to electrochemical sensors for monitoring glucose for diabetes).
105 See Susan Malanowski, Innovation Incentives: How Companies Foster Innovation
(Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://www.wilsongroup.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/03/InnovationIncentives.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5MK-Y523]) (identifying the various forms of compensation companies in the survey provide to employee-inventors).
106 See Emma Farge, ChinaExtends Lead Over US. in GlobalPatentsFilings, UN Says, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-patents/china-extends-lead-over-u-sin-global-patents-filings-u-n-says-idUSKCN2AUOTM [https://perma.cc/ME6B-4KKP].
10 7 SeeXu Jing & Ye Wanli King, Notes on a Recent InventorRemuneration Dispute, CHINA
LAW INSIGHT (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2020/09/articles/intellectualproperty/notes-on-a-recent-inventor-remuneration-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/B5F9-P8E7] (discussing Article 16 of China's Patent Law and explaining that the Implementing Rules of the Patent
Law further provide the statutory remuneration in the absence of a contract).
According to Article 76 of the Implementation Regulations, a patentee-employer may
reach an agreement with the inventor or have policies to determine reward and remuneration for inventions. Article 78 provides that, if the patentee-employer does not have
agreements or policies on rewards and remuneration, the default legal scheme for remuneration would be: 1) at least 2% of after-tax profits for invention or utility model and
at least 0.2% of after-tax profits for design patent; or 2) if the patent is licensed, at least
10% of after-tax income from the patent license.
Id. See also Xia Zheng & Mengmeng Yu, Rewardand Remunerationfor Service Invendons, IAM
(Apr. 6, 2016),
https://www.iam-media.com/reward-and-remuneration-service-inventions
[https://perma.cc/X27X-Q9F6].
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exploitation of the invention or ten percent of the royalties from the licensing
of the issued patents."
In U.S. research universities, the university is often the owner of patents
based on the efforts of employees engaged in research since the passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.109 Universities have adopted policies that require that
researchers disclose their inventions, thereby allowing university tech offices
to determine whether the university should seek patent protection."' Large
research universities such as the University of California system, MIT, Stanford, the University of Texas, Johns Hopkins, and Purdue are among the top
100 universities with the most patents in 2020.111 Inventors at these top uni-

versities often receive rewards if their patents are exploited by their universities through licensing deals. For instance, at Stanford University, the inventors receive one-third of the net equity which is the total equity minus 15%
of such equity to cover the university's administrative expenses. 12
In summary, individual innovators are the true creators of patented inventions. Depending on the workplaces, employees are encouraged to innovate
through various incentives. For the innovators who invent, however, they
rarely receive a share of profits from their patented inventions under U.S. law
and practice.

10

8 See Jing & King, supra note 107.

109 See Landmark Law Helped Universities Lead the Way,

AUTM, https://autm.net/abouttech-transfer/advocacy/legislation/bayh-dole-act [https://perma.cc/WLQ2-YBEU] (describing the
major provisions of the Act and how universities retain title to inventions and engage in technology
transfers).
"0 See Submit Your Disclosure, .MASS. INST. OF TECH., https://tlo.mit.edu/disdose-protectyour-intellectual-property/submit-your-disclosure [https://perma.cc/8Y4A-JVSW] ("Inventors are
encouraged to contact our office and/or submit an MIT Technology Disclosure Form as early as
possible in the inventive process, before a public disclosure of the idea or invention. The disclosure
form is designed to gather specific information that will enable evaluation of the invention's patentability and commercial potential."). See alsoDiscosureForms PURDUE OFF. OF TECH. COM.,
https://www.prf.org/otc/disclosure/form-types.html [https://perma.cc/SNZ6-7MNY] ("Technology Disclosure Form-This form is used for disclosing intellectual property to the Office of Technology Commercialization. The disclosure document is to be prepared and submitted by the inventor(s), and is then completed in conjunction with OTC. It provides the basis for an assessment
of patentability and market opportunity, a fully completed Technology Disclosure Form triggers
the 6-month Innovation Assessment Process within OTC.").
"' Nat'l Acad. of Inventors, Top 100 Worldwide UniversitiesGranted U.S. Utility Patentsin
6
2020(2020), https://academyofinventors.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/0 /NAI-IPO-Top-100Universities-Granted-U.S.-Utility-Patents-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BMR-9H5A].
1 2 See EquityAcquisition in Technology Licensingand DistanceLearningAgreements STANFORD UNIv., https://doresearch.stanford.edu/policies/research-policy-handbook/conflicts-commitment-and-interest/equity-acquisition-technology-licensing-and-distance-learning-agreements
[https://perma.cc/4HVC-T8ZB].
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III. Designing Ex Post R&D Tax Incentives for Corporate Taxpayers
Corporations (unlike individuals) are taxed at the same rate on all of their
income-regardless of the classification of that income. Thus, royalties received from the licensing of a patent are taxed at the same rate as gains realized
from the sale of the patent." 3 And both of these are taxed at the same rate as
any other category of corporate income received. For example, royalties from
the licensing of a patent are taxed the same as rent received from the leasing
of a building. And gains realized from the sale of a patent are taxed the same
as gains realized from the sale of land.
Historically, the U.S. government has eschewed offering ex post tax rewards to corporations for successful R&D efforts, such as a lower tax rate for
patent royalties or patent gains. Instead, the government relies on its ex ante
rules-tax deduction or tax credit-to incentivize corporate R&D investment. These ex ante tools, however, have fundamental design flaws that have
been highlighted in the literature." 4 For example, the current, immediate tax
deduction for R&D spending is slated to expire in 2022; at that point R&D
costs will only be deductible ratably over a five-year period." 5 Furthermore,
the current tax credit for R&D, while now permanent, is less robust than the
R&D tax credit in many other countries.1 6 The U.S. tax credit is 20% of

&

1
3 Royalties are taxable. IR.C. § 61(a)(7). Gains from dealings in property are also taxable.
I.R.C. § 61(a)(3). Both categories are taxed at the same rate. I.R.C. § 11. Note that prior to 2018,
the Code imposed a maximum 35% tax rate for net capital gains for years in which a corporation's
ordinary income tax rate exceeded 35%. I.R.C. § 1201(a), repealed by the TCJA, Pub. L No. 11597, § 13001(b)(2)(A), 131 Stat. at 2096. In effect, the alternative tax did not apply because the
maximum corporate income tax rate was 35%. Congress repealed the alternate tax for net capital
gains when it lowered the corporate rate to 21%. TCJA, Pub. L No. 115-97, § 13001(a), 131
Stat. at 2096.
4
" See, e.g., Nguyen & Maine, supra note 1, at 1737 (noting some reasons why the research tax
credit is not available for many individual and corporate innovators).
15 This change will place the United States further from the global norm. Some countries offer
enhanced tax deductions greater than 100% for qualifying R&D expenditures. See Graetz
Doud, supra note 63, at 353-54 (summarizing countries that have offered super deductions for
R&D, such as Austria, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Czech Republic). The
United Kingdom, for example, provides an enhanced deduction of 230% for qualifying research
and development expenditures by small or medium-sized enterprises and a 13% tax credit for large

enterprises. EU TAX CENTRE, KPMG, UNITED KINGDOM COUNTRY PROFILE (Aug. 2020),

https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2020/10/uk-country-profile-2020.pdf

[https://

perma.cc/XJ6N-XMTZ].
16 The U.S. government has acknowledged that reforms should be made to increase the effectiveness of the R&D tax credit. President Obama, for example, suggested simplifying the credit by
repealing the outdated formula and enhancing the credit for pass-through business. THE WHITE
HOUSE & DEP'T OF THE TREAS., THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN

UPDATE 21 (Apr. 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ThePresidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
29XE-XNSW] [hereinafter THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK].
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qualified R&D spending above a company's normal level of R&D investment; in contrast, many other countries offer a tax credit greater than 20%
(e.g., 25% in Spain and Ireland; 30% in France). In addition, the U.S. credit
is incremental (applicable only if the company increases its R&D over time);
many other countries, on the other hand, offer a volume-based credit (applicable simply on the volume or amount of qualified R&D spending).117
As a backstop to inadequately designed deduction and credit rules, the
U.S. government could consider back-end tax incentives for successful R&D.
Back-end, or expost, tax incentives could take one of three forms: (1) complete exemption from taxation of income from intellectual property; (2) imposition of a lower effective tax rate on income from intellectual property; or
(3) current deferral (i.e., postponement) of taxation of income from intellectual property. In the current political climate, the first two options may be
unrealistic. The third approach for R&D is a novel, but perhaps more realistic, approach.
A. Exempt IntellectualPropertyIncome from Taxation
Corporations first became subject to an entity tax in 1895.118 The Revenue
Act of 1894 imposed a two percent income tax on individuals and corporate

117 See Louise Kelly, Looldng to the Future: Life Ailer the "Double Irish," I NT'L
(Feb. 24, 2015),

TAx REV.
https://www.intemationaltaxreview.com/Article/3430276/Looking-to-the-fi-

ture-Life-after-the-Double-Irish.html; Patrick Eparvier, Monitoringand Analysis ofPoliciesand
Public FinancingInstruments Conducive to Higher Levels ofR&D Investment-The "Policy
Mix" Project-CountryReview France, 19 (Mar. 2007), http://ec.europa.eu-invest-in-research/
pdf/downloaden/france.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CAM-Q5S9];PwC, supra note 115.
8
" Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349,28 Stat. 509. For a history of early revenue laws, see Patrick
E. Hobbs, Entity Classification:The One Hundred-YearDebate,44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437,44159 (1995); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, CorporateRegulation and the Ongins of the CorporateIn-

come Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990); Stephen B. Scallen, FederalIncomeTaxation ofProfessional
Associations and Corporations,49 MINN. L. REV. 603, 610-13 (1965). Corporations were not
subject to the first federal income tax, which was enacted in 1861. Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45,
12 Stat. 292. The 1861 Act imposed a tax on "every person residing in the United States." Id at
§ 49. The term "person" apparently meant that individuals were taxed, but not corporations. See

Scallen, supra, at 610 n.38.
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income." 9 The 1894 Act was declared unconstitutional a year after its enactment.12 0 In 1909, however, corporate taxation arose again. The 1909 Revenue Act imposed a one percent tax on the net income of corporations. The
corporate income tax has been in existence ever since, with rate fluctuations
over time.' Different theories have been used to justify an entity tax on corporations. 2 3 Under the "natural entity theory," the corporation is viewed as
an entity separate and distinct from its owners, with many of the qualities of
natural persons. As the corporation is like a natural person, it should pay tax
like a person. 24 The United States is not alone in taxing corporations. Most
industrialized countries-indeed all advanced countries that comprise the

"9 Ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (imposing the tax on "all other corporations, companies,
or associations doing business for profit in the United States, no matter how created or organized,
but not including partnerships").
12 The Supreme Court held that the 1894 tax was a direct tax on property, not apportioned
among the states in proportion to the population as required by the U.S. Constitution. See Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, vacaing157U.S. 429 (1895).
" Corporate Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (imposing tax on the net income of
"every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital
stock represented by shares").
122 Until recently, the United States had one of the highest corporate income tax rates in the
world, with a top marginal rate of 35%. Many OECD countries had lowered their corporate tax
rates in an effort to attract investment. In fact, over several decades, the average top marginal corporate income tax rate in the OECD dropped from appropriately 4 8% to approximately 25%. See
Table 11.1. Statutory CorporateIncome Tax Rare, OECD.STAT, last accessed Oct. 19, 2021,
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLEII1 [https://perma.cc/VYK8-5K99]. As
a result, many U.S. multinational companies engaged in aggressive tax strategies to shift their intellectual property and related income offshore through the use of foreign subsidiaries. SeeJEFFREY
A. MAINE & XUAN-THAO NGUYEN, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOLDING COMPANY: TAX
USE AND ABUSE FROM VICTORIA'S SECRET TO APPLE (2017). In response, the United States re-

cently lowered its corporate tax rate to a flat 21%. I.RC. § 11, as amended by the TCJA.
23
See Jeffrey A. Maine, LinkingLinitedLiability andEntity Taxation:A Critiqueofthe ALI
Reporters'Study on the Taxation ofPrivateBusiness Enterprises,62 U. PIT. L. REV. 223, 244
(2000) ("[Elarly versions of the corporate tax adopted a theory of taxation that focused on the
statutory benefit of limited liability, either a benefits theory of taxation or an artificial entity view
of the corporation with a heavy focus on limited liability privileges granted by the state, rather than
the natural entity theory.").
1 2 4Professor Klein has offered two views of the entity theory. See William A. Klein, Income
Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REv. 13 (1972). Under an extreme view of the entity
theory, the corporation is a nonphysical legal devise that has been "converted into a person-or at
least into a thing with many of the qualities of a person," and, hence, should pay a tax like a person.
Id. at 53. Under a less extreme view of the entity theory, the "fictional quality of the corporate
person" are analyzed to determine whether the entity is really separate and apart from its owners.
Id at 44. If the corporation is seen as separate for nontax purposes, then an entity tax is justified.
See a/soJennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A PoliticalTheoryofCorporateTaxation, 105 YALE
L.J. 325, 331 (1995) (suggesting the "entity theory was indeed the original basis for imposing a
separate corporate tax").
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-levy
a tax on corporate profits.'
The ultimate tax incentive for R&D activity would be total exemption
from taxation of income derived from intellectual property-royalties from
licensing of successful intellectual property or gains from dispositions of such
property. As a general rule, a corporation is taxed on all of its "income,"
broadly defined as "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over
which the taxpayer has complete dominion."" Although realized income is
a broad concept, there are limitations on its meaning. Indeed, Congress has
decided, for various policy reasons, to exclude certain types of receipts or benefits from the income tax base.1 27 Each statutory exclusion addresses some
particular congressional concern or achieves some particular goal.
Many of these statutory exclusions are available to individuals and not corporations. For example, damages received in certain tort actions are excluded
from taxation, perhaps reflecting congressional compassion for those who suffer personal physical injury or sickness.12 Gain from the sale of an individual's principal residence is excluded, promoting the goal of eliminating tax
29
considerations from the decision to move from one home to another.1 And
certain fringe benefits received by an employee are excluded, in part reflecting
30
congressional concern about administrative convenience.
While many statutory exclusions benefit individual taxpayers, some do
benefit corporate taxpayers. Examples include interest on state and local
bonds,' 3' income from discharge of indebtedness, 132 improvements by lessees
on corporate property,

33

and contributions to the capital of corporations, 134

to name a few.

125 ee Kyle Pomerleau, Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2014, TAx FOUND.

(Nov. 12, 2014),

http://taxfoundation.org/article/sources-government-revenue-oecd-

20 4

1

[https://perma.cc/4NV6-BGG6].
12 6 The starting point in computing a taxpayer's tax liability is to determine the taxpayer's gross
income. Section 61 of the Code defines gross income broadly as "all income from whatever source
derived." I.R.C. § 61(a) (emphasis added). In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426,
431 (1955), the Supreme Court defined income as "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayer [has] complete dominion."
127 See, e.g., I.R.C. %§ 101-140.

12 8 I.R.C. § 104.
29

I.R.C. § 121.
I.R.C. § 132.
13 I.R.C. § 103.
32
I.R.C. § 108.
133
I.R.C. § 109.
-

130

1

I.R.C. § 118.
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1. Exemption Examples
Statutory income exemptions are often designed to encourage certain economic behavior. While an ideal tax system would be neutral in order to avoid
unnecessarily shaping economic behavior, this neutrality principle has lost
ground over the past half century to what might be termed "social engineering." Indeed, many tax rules have been enacted to encourage various behaviors; they deliberately attempt to drive economic decision making.135 A prime
example is section 1202 of the Code. It provides taxpayers other than corporations a 100% exclusion for gains recognized with respect to the stock of
qualified small business corporations."' This exemption was enacted as an
incentive for taxpayers to start and invest in certain small businesses. 137 Of
course, various requirements must be met to benefit from the 100% exclusion. The stock must be in a company that satisfies an active business requirement,138 and the stock must be held for more than five years.13 9
A more recent example of social engineering is a new rule relating to investments in qualified opportunity zones, created by the TCJA.140 The new
rule provides tax benefits to taxpayers who realize capital gains and invest
them in certain so-called qualified opportunity funds (QOFs) that invest in
businesses and real estate located in economically distressed communities."'
More specifically, if a taxpayer has a capital gain, the taxpayer can defer paying tax on that capital gain by making an investment in a qualified opportunity zone-that is, by making an investment in a QOF within 180 days.
The original deferred gain must be recognized in 2026 (or in the year of sale
if the QOF investment is sold earlier), providing a healthy amount of deferral.
In addition to providing for deferralofthe original gain, the rule provides for

35

1
36

MILLER & MAINE, supra note 30, at 6.

1 I.R.C § 1202.

137 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13113(a), 107 Stat.
312, 422. For an overview of the provision, the history behind the development of amendments,
and the apparent intent for enactment, see Beckett G. Candey, The New Section 1202 Tax-Free
Business Sale: Congress Rewards Small Businesses that Survived the GreatRecession, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1127 (2012).
13 I.R.C. § 1202(c)(2)(A). Specifically, the corporation must use at least 80% of its assets, measured by value, in the active conduct of one or more qualified trades or businesses, which is defined
by negation (i.e., any business other than those listed in the statute). I.R.C. § 1202(e)(3).
39
I.R.C. § 1202(a)(1).
140I.R.C. %§ 1400Z-1, 1400Z-2.
141 See Notice 2019-42, 2019-29 I.R.B. 352 (providing a list of "qualified opportunity zones"
by state). Congress has occasionally offered temporary tax incentives designed to encourage investment in distressed communities (e.g., so-called empowerment zones, the District of Columbia
Enterprise Zone, the Gulf Opportunity Zone). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, INCENTIVES FOR DISTRESSED COMMUNrrIEs: EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND RENEWAL COMMUNI-

TIES, JCX-38-09 (2009).
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the exclusion of gain in some cases.142 Most notably, the appreciation in the
QOF investment in excess of the original deferred gain is completely exempt
143
from tax if the taxpayer holds its QOF investment for at least ten years.
The United States could consider enacting something along these lines
(the rules for qualified small business investments and QOF investments) for
taxpayers with certain R&D investments. A 100% income exclusion for intellectual property income could be designed narrowly to achieve targeted
goals and minimize revenue loss for the government. Taxpayers eligible for
the exclusion could be limited to companies that engage in original research
(and not available to companies that outsource R&D or purchase R&D); the
benefit could be geared toward small or large companies. R&D activity eligible for the exclusion could be specified. A list of R&D projects, such as vaccine development, could be targeted for the benefit; alternatively, the exemption could be designed to apply only to registered R&D activities. And the
type of intellectual property income exempt from taxation could be specified
(e.g., royalties from licensing of intellectual property, gains from the sale of
intellectual property, gains from the sales of products whose value lies predominantly in the underlying intellectual property, etc.).
2. The Prohibitive Costs ofExemption
The statutory income exclusion would no doubt be costly for the government, as are most of the statutory exclusions in the Code. Exclusions create
what are known as "tax expenditures," which occur when a special rule causes
the government to collect less revenue than it would collect if all net accessions to wealth were taxed. 144 Already federal income tax revenues are reduced
by hundreds of billions of dollars annually because of existing tax expenditures. In fact, the ex ante tax incentives (deduction and credit) for R&D represent some of the largest business tax expenditures for the U.S. government.
Expensing of R&D expenditures was expected to cost the government $119
142

If the taxpayer holds its QOF investment for at least five years, the taxpayer may increase the
basis in the QOF investment by ten percent of the original deferred gain (this effectively excludes
10% of the original deferred gain). I.RC. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the taxpayer holds its QOF
investment for at least seven years, the taxpayer may increase basis in the QOF investment by 15%
(instead of 10%) of the original deferred gain (this effectively excludes 15% of the original deferred
gain). I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv). Any remaining deferred capital gain is taxed on the earlier
of (1) the date the investment fund is sold or (2) December 31, 2026.
WIf the taxpayer holds its QOF investment for at least ten years, the taxpayer may increase the
basis in its QOF investment to its fair market value on the date the investment is sold. This effectively excludes the gain attributable to the appreciation in the investment after the original deferred
gain is recognized in 2026 (or earlier in case of an earlier sale). I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(c).
1 The federal government maintains what is known as the tax expenditure budget, a compilation of all of the tax expenditures. See Tax Expendiures, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, https://
[https://perma.cc/
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/Tax-Expenditures.aspx

M84T-EVSG].
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billion over the ten-year, 2018-2027 period.14 The tax credit for R&D was
expected to cost the government $163 billion in tax revenues over the same
ten-year period.1 46 The additional revenue loss from a new intellectual property income exclusion may not be viewed as outweighing its benefit, especially
since the government already has two costly tax expenditures to encourage
new R&D (i.e., the tax deduction and tax credit referenced earlier). The costs
of total exemption may explain why most countries have not adopted such
approach.
B. Lower the Effective Tax Rare on IntellectualPropertyIncome
As an alternative to exempting intellectual property income from taxation,
the U.S. government could consider adopting a reduced tax rate on R&D
investment returns. The concept is not a new one. Indeed, many countries in
recent years have adopted such an approach.1 47 In these countries, so-called
"patent boxes" or "innovation boxes" basically provide a reduced effective tax
rate on income associated with eligible intellectual property. Some of these
regimes exempt a certain percentage of income (royalty income, and, in some
cases gains from disposition) from qualifying intellectual property, which has
the effect of reducing the effective corporate tax rate on that intellectual property.1 48 In contrast, some regimes allow certain income from qualifying intellectual property to be taxed at reduced rates. 49
1

45

See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.1, THE "TAX CUTS AND JOBS AcT," FISCAL YEARS 2018-2027, JCX-

67-17 (Dec. 18, 2017). See also U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DDY-YBLE].
1" See Tax Expenditures2019, supra note 145, at 21, 34 (Tables 1 & 3).
147 The United Kingdom's regime became effective in 2013. See FINANCE ACT 2012, ch. 14
sched. 2 (U.K. PUB. GEN.ACrs), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/14/contents/enacted
[https://perma.cc/47SS-GPTG]. Italy introduced its regime in 2015. See Carlo Maria Paolella,
Andrea Tempestini & Federico Bortolameazzi, The Upcoming Implementation ofthe Italian ParentBoxRegime, McDERMOTT WILL & EMORY (July 31, 2015), http://www.mwe.com/The-Upcoming-Implementation-of-the-Italian-Patent-Box-Regime-07-31-2015/
[https://perma.cc/
3JP7-5HHG]. Ireland first adopted the concept in 1973. See Robert D. Atkinson & Scott Andes,
ParentBoxes: Innovation in Tax Policy and Tax Policyfor Innovation, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. at 3, 5 (Oct. 2011), http://www.itif.org/files/2011-patent-box-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M8XH-MLRS]. The regime was repealed in 2010, only for a new one to be enacted in
2016. See Wim Eynatten, European R&D andIP Tax Regimes:A ComparativeStudy, 36 INTERTAx 502, 512 (2008).
"'Exemption rates vary (e.g., 80% in Belgium and Luxemburg, but 50% in Hungary and
Spain).
149 France, for example, does not offer an exemption rate, but does offer an effective rate of ten
percent on qualifying intellectual property. KPMG, France Country Profile 2 (June 2021),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2021/10/france-country-profile-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DSG-NKG2]. Likewise, the United Kingdom allows for certain income from
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The United States has yet to follow the global trend and adopt a low tax
rate specifically for intellectual property income, although there have been
15 0
congressional proposals for such a regime. There are several plausible rea151
sons why. First, the government seems stuck on accepting er ante tax incentives (R&D deduction and credit provisions) as doing a better job of encouraging new R&D; ex post tax incentives (patent box regimes) can be
viewed as less effective because they provide benefits for intellectual property
already in existence. 152 Second, patent box regimes require new rules and

qualifying patents to be taxed at a reduced rate of ten percent. KMPG, United Kingdom Country
Profile 7 (Aug. 2020), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2020/10/uk-country-pro-

file-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHV4-XAS2].
1 The closest policy the United States has to a patent box is a special deduction for certain
foreign-derived intangible income (FDII). I.R.C. § 250, added by the TCJA. This provision grants
the benefit of a reduced tax rate to FDII earned directly by a U.S. corporation. The provision
provides a 37.5% deduction for FDII, which amounts to a 13.125% effective tax rate on FDII.
Mindy Herzfeld, For Biden's Treastuy Team, Big Ideas Are About to Meet Reality 170 TAX
NOTES FED. (TA) 1054 (Feb. 15, 2021). For critique of the regime, see Rebecca M. Kysar, Critiquing (andRepairing) the New InternationalTax Regime, 128 YALE L.J. 339 (2018). The Biden
Administration has proposed eliminating the FDII regime. See Press Release, The White House,
supranote 20.
Prior to the enactment of section 250, there were calls for a patent box in the United States. For
example, former House Committee on Ways and Means Chairman, David Camp, proposed a

15% rate on certain intellectual property income. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH
CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE WAYS AND MEANS DISCUSSION DRAFT PROVISIONS
TO ESTABLISH A PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION SYSTEM FOR THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME

34 (2011), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/FINAL TE_01-WaysandMeans_
ParticipationExemptionDiscussionDraft.pdf.
151 THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK, supra note 116, at 22 ("Measured by the criterion of economic efficiency, the innovation box comes up short as a desirable tax policy tool."). See Remarks
by Jason Furman, EncouragingInnovation and the Role of Tax Policy, JOINT INT'L TAX POL'Y F.
& GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR., Mar. 11, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
20160311_innovationand&tax-policy-itpfpdf [https://perma.cc/Z8SL-HABJ]. See alsoJason J.
Fichmer & Adam N. Michel, Don'tPutAmerican Innovation in a PatentBox: Tax Policy, IntelIectual Property, and the Fure ofR&D, MERCATUS CrR., GEO. MASON UNIV. (Dec. 2015),
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Fichtner-Patent-Boxes-MOP.pdf
3LDC-EDE2].
1

52

THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK, supra note 116, at 22 ("Compared to the R&E credit, an

innovation box is less effective in encouraging innovation."); Graetz & Doud, supra note 63,
at 374-75 (summarizing data on benefits of R&D tax incentives). As further support for the notion that the government prefers ex ante R&D incentives, a proposed change in the Biden Tax
Plan is repeal of the deduction for foreign-derived intangible income (FDII). DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2022 REVENUE PRO-

POSALS 11 (May 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/General-Explanations-FY
2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BGG-L8NA] [hereinafter the Greenbook]. The deduction, added by
the TCJA, is 37.5% of a domestic corporation's FDII, which is a portion of its intangible income
determined on a formulaic basis that is derived from exports. According to the Greenbook, the
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compliance checks which would only further complicate our tax system."
Third, patent boxes can result in a "race to the bottom" wherein countries
compete to have the lowest rate on intellectual property income.15 Finally,
patent boxes are costly.'"' If the United States adopted a patent box, the regime, considering the large size of the U.S. market, could result in a significant loss of revenue.1

56

In lieu of targeting intellectual property specifically for a special low tax
rate, the government could consider adopting, more generally, a reduced tax
rate applicable to corporate capital gains. From 1913 (the year of the enactment of the modern income tax) to 1921, the tax laws did not distinguish
between gains from the disposition of capital assets and other types of income.157 Since 1921, however, gains from sales or exchanges of capital assets
have been subject to preferential tax rates for individualtaxpayers only and
not corporate taxpayers. 151 Corporate taxpayers generally have not been allowed preferential tax treatment on capital gains. 159
Preferential treatment for corporate capital gains would lower the rate of
tax on gains recognized on sales of corporate patents but not on royalty income received with respect to corporate patents. That is because, under general characterization principles, the capital gain preference is given only to
"sales or exchanges" of "capital assets.""' Unless considered inventory, corporate patents would qualify as capital assets and, hence, give rise to capital
FDII deduction is not an effective way to encourage R&D in the United States; it provides large
tax breaks to companies with excess profits rather than incentivizing new domestic R&D. Id
153 THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK, supra note 116, at 22. The design of any patent box is complicated. For example, (1) the effective tax rate must be agreed upon, (2) the types of intellectual
property eligible for special tax rate treatment must be defined, (3) the scope of qualifying income
(i.e., the base of income that qualifies for preferential tax treatment) must be determined, and (4)
the degree of external contributions permitted must be determined (i.e., should only self-developed
intellectual property qualify for special rate treatment or should income from outsourced or purchased intellectual property be included?).
'5 Id
'5 Id The United Kingdom, for example, saw a reduction in corporate revenues with its patent
box even though additional innovation was reported. See Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller & Martin
O'Connell, Ownership of IntellectualPropertyand Corporate Taxation, 112 J. PUB. ECON. 12
(2014).
56
A way to make up the tax revenue loss would have to be considered. See Luca Gattoni-Celli,
Ryan Eyeing Research Cost Recovery to Pay for Innovation Box, 148 TAX NOTES (TA) 824
(Aug. 24, 2015) (proposing 5-year amortization of R&D costs).
157
See Howard J. Rothman, Pamela M. Capps & Barry Herzog, Capita/Assets, 561-3rd TAX
MGMT. PORT. (BNA) II (2021) ("Before the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1921, there was no
statutory distinction between profits realized upon the sale of property and other items of income.").
158
Id. (citing The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 277).
60

I.R.C. § 1222.
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asset treatment.161 This lower rate would incentivize risky R&D investment.
Indeed, one argument in favor of preferential treatment for capital gains is
that the preference reduces a disincentive to risk taking.' A company's patent portfolio, which would be subject to capital asset treatment, reflects risk
capital. Taxation of patent gains at the regular corporate income tax rate un63
dermines, rather than incentivizes, risk taking.1
A tax rate preference for corporate capital gains generally would amount
to an indirect ex post incentive for successful R&D. However, a reduced tax
rate on capital gains generally would face the same hurdles as a more targeted
rate reduction on intellectual property specifically. The incentive may be
viewed as unnecessary, or less effective than ex ante rules, in encouraging new
R&D activity. The general rate preference for a corporation's capital gains
over other types of income would only increase the stakes on which intellectual property income qualifies (e.g., what types of intellectual property should
qualify and what types of dispositions should qualify), adding additional
61

I.RC. § 1221. Note that patents used in a company's trade or business are not capital assets.

I.R.C. § 1221(a)(2). However, such patents are considered quasi-capital assets, or section 1231
property, and may be accorded capital asset status nonetheless. I.RC. § 1231. Patents held by a
taxpayer whose personal efforts created the property are also not capital assets or quasi-assets. I.R.C.
§% 1221(a)(3), 1231(b)(1). However, this capital asset exception arguably applies to only individual creators and not corporate creators.
162 Anthony P. Polito, Smal Business Corporation Stock Special Tax Incentives, 760 TAx.
MGMT. PORT. (BNA) I.B n.10 (2021) (citing John W. Lee, Critiqueo/Current Congressional
Capital Gains Contentions 15 VA. TAx REv. 1 (1995); Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H.
Schenk, Colloquium on CapitalGains: The Case for a CapitalGainsPreference, 48 TAx L. REV.
319 (1993); Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summay ofthe Capital GainsArguments, 35 TAXES 247
(1957)). There are other arguments supporting preferential treatment for capital gains. It is argued
that it would be inequitable to tax capital gains at high rates in the year of disposition when those
gains may have accrued over several years. Further, it is contended that a high tax on capital gains
may effectively lock some taxpayers into their existing investment and impair the mobility of capital, whereas a tax preference encourages the free flow of capital into new enterprises and productive
investments, increases economic activity and growth, and ultimately creates more tax revenue for
the government. See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 30, at 253 (discussing arguments for and
against according a tax rate preference to capital gains).
63
1 Polito, supra note 162 (making the risk-taking argument):
Taxation at ordinary rates undermines risk taking, because the ordinary tax treatment
takes a larger share of the upside than the downside. In other words, profits are fully
taxable, but losses often are not fully useable either because of various loss disallowance
rules or because the taxpayer does not have sufficient other income against which to deduct the losses. Examining an investment prospectively, therefore, the tax system causes
the taxpayer to bear a greater percentage of downside risk than the taxpayer enjoys of
upside potential. On a risk-weighted basis, therefore, it reduces the expected rate of return
of risky investments. The same disparity of treatment does not apply to riskless investments. Although the income tax reduces the return to riskless investments as well, the
argument runs, it has a greater effect on risky investments.
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complexity to the Code and transaction costs for corporate taxpayers. Unless
targeted at risky R&D projects, the approach would be extremely costly as a
number of non-intellectual property assets and transactions would also qualify for the special treatment.'
As a final note, the appropriate tax rate to impose on corporate income has
been the subject of fierce debate. Until recently, the United States maintained
the same high corporate tax rate for 30 years. During that period, many
OECD countries lowered their corporate tax rates in an effort to attract investment. In fact, the average top marginal corporate income tax rate in the
OECD dropped from approximately 48% to approximately 25%.165 Recently, in response, the United States lowered its corporate tax rate from 35%
to 21%. Historically, however, the United States has been an outlier when it
comes to rate reduction policies. Lowering the rate on intellectual property
income, or extending a capital gain rate preference to corporations, seems
highly unlikely in the present political climate. Indeed, the Biden Administration has recently proposed to move in the opposite direction-raising the
corporate income tax rate as well as the capital gains tax rate applicable to
individuals. 166
C. Defer (Postpone) Taxation oflntellectualPropertyIncome

In lieu of exempting intellectual property income from taxation or reducing the effective tax rate on such income, the U.S. government could consider
a third option-taxation deferral. The income tax is imposed on an annual
basis, the tax year. Taxpayers will nearly always be economically advantaged
by the deferral of taxable income to a later year.' 6 7 The advantage is a reduction of the taxpayer's current tax liability, which leaves the taxpayer with the
use of its money for a while longer.

16 Under general characterization principles, sales and exchanges of so-called capital assets (de-

fined in section 1221) or quasi-capital assets (defined in section 1231) produce capital gains. Generally, non-inventory property used in business (sg., land, buildings, and other assets) qualify for
capital asset treatment. As noted earlier, however, for corporate taxpayers, capital gains are taxed at
the16same
rate as other income.
5
See Table I11, Statutorycorporateincome tax rate, supra note 122.
166 President Biden's proposal would lead to the United States having the highest tax rate on
capital gains. See Clifton Painter, Biden's Top MarginalCapitalGains Tax Rate Would Be Hghestin OECD, TAxFOUND. (July 6, 2021), https://taxfoundation.org/biden-capital-gains-tax-rateoecd/ [https://perma.cc/848T-M7K4].
167
The government, in contrast, has an interest in the acceleration of income reporting since
that will increase the government's current tax revenues. An evenhanded set of rules in the Code
help navigate between these competing interests of the taxpayer and the government. The primary
determinant of the timing of income is the taxpayer's method of accounting. There are two main
methods: the cash method and the accrual method. SeeI.RC. § 446(c); seeaLsoMILLER &MAINE,
supra note 30, at 209.
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Deferral of income reporting is at the heart of tax planning. Indeed, taxpayers often attempt to structure transactions to delay income taxation to a
later year.1 68 An example is the so-called "installment sale." If a taxpayer sells
a patent for $1,000,000 cash in Year 1, the taxpayer will have to report and
pay tax on $1,000,000 of gain in Year 1.169 However, if a taxpayer sells a
patent for $1,000,000 in an installment sale whereby the taxpayer receives

$100,000 each year for the next ten years, the taxpayer will report and pay

70
tax on only $100,000 of gain in Year 1, $100,000 in Year 2, and so on.1

The installment method of reporting, which is sanctioned by the Code, is
favorable to taxpayers because it defers tax liability until actual payment (as
17
distinguished from the installment note) is received. 1 It is justified primarily
on the basis of taxpayer liquidity.
1. DeferralExamples
There are numerous provisions in the Code that sanction deferral of income reporting. Settling on a unified justification for these pro-taxpayer rules
is difficult.1 72 Some of these deferral rules, also known in tax jargon as "nonrecognition" provisions, are premised on the fact that a taxpayer's economic
position has not substantially changed as a result of the transaction.1 73 Consider the formation of a corporation. From a tax perspective, formation of a
corporation is essentially a sale or exchange between a corporation and its
founding shareholders. The shareholders transfer property (e.g., a highly appreciated patent) to the corporation in return for stock in the corporation;
6

' s This

is not always easy because of the statutorily mandated methods of accounting. Under
the cash method of reporting, income is reported when it is either actually or constructively received. Reg. § 1.451-1(a). An item of income is constructively received when it is credited to the
taxpayer's account or set aside for him and there are no substantial restrictions on his control. Reg.
§ 1.451-2(a). For example, suppose a patent owner dedines to accept a royalty check on December
31, Year 1. Instead, the patent owner asks that the royalty be given to her on January 2 of Year 2.
Her purpose in making this request is to defer the tax on that royalty until Year 2. The doctrine of
constructive receipt will require her to report the income in Year 1.
169 This assumes the taxpayer has a zero basis in the patent, which would be the case if the taxpayer previously expensed all R&D costs under section 174; see alsoI.R.C. § 1001(a) (providing
that the gain realized on a sale is the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis).
170 I.R.C. § 453. An installment sale is a sale where at least one payment is received after the end
of the year in which the disposition occurs. I.R.C. § 453(b)(1). The key to applying the installment
4
method is found in section 53(c). Butsee I.R.C. § 453A(c) (requiring the payment of interest on
the deferred tax liability under certain circumstances).
171 This is different from the outcome that would normally arise under either the cash method
or the accrual method of accounting. The installment method is an exception to both of these
methods. It automatically applies unless the taxpayer elects out. I.R.C. § 453(d).
1 72 See Fred B. Brown, DesiningNonrecognition Rules Under the InternalRevenue Code, 24
FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2021).
73
1 See Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (stating that "[t]he underlying assumption of these exceptions is that
the new property is substantially a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated. .. ").
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the corporation issues its valuable stock for the property received from the
shareholders. In the absence of overriding rules, each party would have to
report gain or loss on the exchange.1 74 However, Congress has chosen to treat
corporate formations as nonrecognition events under certain circumstances. 75 A justification for the approach is that current gain recognition
may be inappropriate because the shareholder may have simply changed the
form but not the substance of her investment (the shareholder once owned
the patent directly but now owns it indirectly through a controlling interest
in the corporation).
The tax rules with respect to corporate formations bear a strong similarity
to the so-called "like-kind" exchange rules. The Code grants nonrecognition
of gain or loss on the exchange of business or investment real property for
like-kind business or investment real property.1 76 The basic rationale for the
rule, as for most nonrecognition provisions, is that the taxpayer has not substantially changed her overall economic position. The investment vehicle may
have changed but the substance of the investment remains. Put another way,
one might say that the taxpayer has not "cashed in her chips."
Nonrecognition provisions are generally considered taxpayer friendly.
However, there is a catch. Nonrecognition usually means deferral, not exemption, from gain recognition. In the case of a corporate formation, any
gain lurking in property transferred to a corporation will be taxed when the
taxpayer sells the stock received in exchange. In the case of a like-kind exchange, any gain lurking in property transferred in the exchange will be taxed
when the taxpayer sells the property received in the exchange. In short, nonrecognition provisions merely postpone the reporting of gain to a later year

74

§ 1001(c) (providing all gains and losses are recognized (i.e., reportable), unless a nonrecognition
rules
applies).
1 751I.R.C. §§ 351 (preventing current recognition of gains and losses by transferors when property is contributed solely for stock of a corporation if afterwards the transferors are in control of
the corporation); 1032 (granting the corporation nonrecognition treatment). The key operative
provision in most partnership formations is section 721. I.R.C. § 721 (providing that no gain or
loss shall be recognized by a partner upon a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange
for a partnership interest).
176
I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1). The general rule for determining whether property is "like kind" is that
the properties exchanged must be similar in "nature or character." Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b). In this
context, any sort of fee interest in real estate is similar in nature or character to any other form of
fee interest in real estate. Reg. %5 1.1031(a)-1(b) & (c); 1.1031(b)-1(b), Ex. 1.
It should be noted that, until recently, like-kind intellectual property qualified for nonrecognition; now the rule is limited to real property. Whether intellectual property was of a like-kind to
other intellectual property generally depended on the nature or character of the rights involved
(e.g., a patent or copyright) and also on the nature or character of the underlying asset to which
the intellectual property related. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c). For guidance, see Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3),
Ex. 1 & 2; see also TA.M. 2006-02-034 (Sept. 29, 2005) (providing guidance for determining
whether patents and other types of intellectual property are of like kind).
1 I.R.C.
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when the property received in the transaction is sold or disposed of in a tax"

able transaction. 1

In some cases, nonrecognition rules are justified as incentivizing desirable
behavior. In the case of corporate formations, discussed above, nonrecognition fosters capital formation, that is, the pooling of money and other productive assets. In a capitalist society, capital formation is a good thing since
it generates economic activity leading to profits for investors and jobs for employees.
A recent example of a nonrecognition rule designed to incentivize certain
activities is the provision governing investments in qualified opportunity
zones, discussed earlier. 178 Basically, investors can defer tax on capital gain by
making an investment in a qualified opportunity zone-that is, by making
an equity investment in a QOF.179 The original gain deferred is not recognized until 2026 (or in the year of sale if the QOF investment is sold earlier). 180 The tax benefit-several years of tax deferral-was designed to encourage taxpayers to invest in businesses and real estate located in
economically distressed communities.
In addition to providing incentives aimed at encouraging investment in
distressed communities, the government has a history of providing incentives
aimed at encouraging investment in small businesses. 181 For example, section
1045 of the Code allows the tax-deferred rollover of gain from the sale of
stock of one qualified small business into stock of another.8 2

Gain is preserved by giving the taxpayer the same basis in the property received as he or she
had in the property given up in the transaction with certain adjustments. See, e.g., I.R.C.
(corporate formations), 1031(d) (like-kind exchanges).
§§ 358(a)(1)
78
I.RC. § 1400Z-2. See supranotes 140-143 and accompanying text.
7 Other requirements must be met. For example, the taxpayer must make the investment in a
QOF within 180 days of the sale and must make an election on Form 8949. I.R.C. § 1400Z'

2(a)(1)(A).

180 I.R.C.

§ 1400Z-2(b)(1); Reg. § 1.1400Z2(b)-1(b). Of course, basis will be increased by the
gain recognized. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(ii).
181 See I.RC. %§ 1045 (allowing gain from the sale of stock in a qualified small business corporation to be rolled over into the stock of another qualified small business corporation); 1202 (allowing exclusion of gain recognized with respect to stock of a qualified small business corporation);
1244 (allowing ordinary loss treatment with respect to stock of small business corporations). For
analysis, see Polito, supranote 162, at III.
1 2

I.R.C. § 1045. Section 13313 of the TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. at 2133, repealed

section 1044, which permitted tax deferral of gain realized on the sale of publicly traded securities
if the taxpayer used the sales proceeds to purchase common stock in a specialized small business
investment company. SeeI.R.C. § 1044, prior to being stricken by the TCJA.
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2. The Case for Extending Deferralto R&D Income
These examples of tax incentives aimed at encouraging investment in distressed communities and in small businesses are more broadly aimed at encouraging economic growth. Most people would agree that R&D investment
is equally important to economic growth in this country. R&D activity, with
its own positive spillover effects, can lead to technological advances, which
can lead to economic growth. Indeed, few would dispute that R&D spending
to find a COVID-19 vaccine did more for the economy than many other
forms of investment spending. 183 Contextualizing the R&D spending for the
COVID-19 vaccine and its impact requires an acknowledgment that without
the successful vaccine, people cannot return to work safely in many sectors of
the economy." The healthcare cost associated with infection and hospitalization, if there was no COVID-19 vaccine, would continue to escalate.'
With the success of the COVID-19 vaccine, evidence now demonstrates that
vaccinated people receive immediate and measurable health benefits and are

183 See generallyJoseph E. Gagnon et al., Economic Costs andBenefits ofAccelemted Covid19 Vaccinadons, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (May 2021), https://www.piie.com/publica[https://
tions/policy-briefs/economic-costs-and-benefits-accelerated-covid-19-vaccinations
perma.cc/V6Y4-RAEM] ("Emergency measures to research, test, produce, and distribute vaccines
have been expensive, but increases in GDP resulting from the vaccines are expected to exceed those
costs by wide margins.").
184 See Christian E. Weller, The Economic Benefits of Vaccinadons, CTR. FOR AM. PRO.
(July 15, 2021), https://www.americanprogress.orglissues/economy/news/2021/07/15/501698/
economic-benefits-vaccinations/ [https://perma.cc/SMY9-CMFC] (summarizing the many ways
in which vaccinations help the economy recover from the COVID-19 pandemic); HowEconomic
Recovey Hinges on the Vaccine Rollour, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 9, 2021), https://
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/artide/how-economic-recovery-hinges-on-the-vaccine-rollout/
[https://perma.cc/8XMC-GC8X] ("The pace of the economic recovery in the U.S. in 2021 hinges
on the pace of COVID-19 vaccinations, according to a brief by the Penn Wharton Budget Model.
It projects that doubling the number of vaccine doses administered daily to 3 million would create
more than 2 million jobs and boost real GDP by about 1% over the summer of 2021, with smaller
effects later in the year."); Michael Blanding, The High Cost ofthe Slow Covid Vaccine Rollout,
HARv. Bus. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 14, 2021), https:// hbswk.hbs.edulitem/thehigh-cost-of-the-slow-covid-vaccine-rollout [https://perma.cc/H74Z-TDNB] ("Aggressive investment in COVID-19 vaccine production earlier on could have saved lives and prevented $700
billion in global economic losses").
185 Mallory Hackett, Average Cost ofHospital Care for Covid-19 Ranges from $51,000 to
$78,000, Based on Age, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.healthcarefinan[https://
cenews.com/news/average-cost-hospital-care-covid-19-ranges-51000-78000-based-age
perma.cc/B95A-5QD6] (predicting that the "cost of hospitalizations, on top of any other required
treatments for COVID-19, could total $546.6 billion for payers").
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more likely to plan for their futures.1 86 Overall, the R&D spending for devel87
oping the COVID-19 vaccines rescued both life and the economy.'
Moreover, as discussed in an earlier section on the collaboration between
BioNTech and Pfizer for purpose of illustration, R&D investments by BioN88
Tech occur in the early stage of developing mRNA-based vaccines.1 As recalled, the subsequent and substantial R&D investments came from Pfizer
and were key factors to accelerate the pace of R&D at BioNTech on mRNA
for a flu vaccine in 2018.189 The R&D investments made by Pfizer for the
mRNA vaccine for COVID-19, as well as the subsequent clinical phases and
regulatory submissions, were both enormous and risky.'" Overall, the R&D
spending and risks associated with developing a new mRNA vaccine in response to a rapidly ravaging pandemic beg the question on the adequacy of
incentivizing innovations.
3. Design Optionsfor a New DeferralRegime
For these reasons, this Article proposes a new incentive regime-specifically, deferral of taxation of profits from successful R&D if such profits are
reinvested in further R&D. Profits eligible for deferral could include either
royalties from the licensing of self-developed patents or gains from the sale of
self-developed patents, or both. The types of patents eligible for tax deferral
could be limited to vaccine development and related disease diagnosis and
treatments. In light of the rapid mutations of the coronavirus, the new normal now includes living with new variants of coronavirus. The new normal
will require the development of vaccines against these new variants and treatments of associated diseases for the foreseeable future. This recognition provides the rationale for limiting the types of patents eligible for tax deferral.
The incentive regime should reward and encourage similar collaborations
as seen in the partnership between BioNTech and Pfizer. The incentives
should benefit both small biotech companies where innovations occur and
large pharma companies who direct resources to small biotech companies for
6 See Weller, supra note 184 (demonstrating that rising vaccinate rates coincide with better
health care, job prospects, and future education plans). See alsoJanet Alvarez, Why Getting the

Covid-19 Vaccine Will Be Good for America's FinancialHealth, CNBC (Jan. 10, 2021, 8:00
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/10/why-the-covid-19-vaccine-will-be-good-for-financialhealth.html [https://perma.cc/N54Q-UZXU].
87 See Deidre McPhillips, Covid-19 Vaccines SavedNearly280,000Lives in the US, New Re-

search Estimnate, CNN (July 8, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/08/health/covid-vaccinations-prevent-deaths-hospitalizations/index.html

[https://perma.cc/F9SM-PS45]; Victoria Mas-

terson, EqualAccess to Govid-19 Vaccines Could be Worth Billions, WORLD EcoN. (Dec. 15,
2020) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/12/who-covid-vaccines-equitable-access/ [https://
perma.cc/WWJ4-7L3R] (reporting that "10 major economies could be $466 billion better off by
2025" by "averting economic disaster and helping to end the pandemic").
188 See supranotes 92-96 and accompanying text.
181 Press Release, Pfizer, supra note 96.
190 Id
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specialized R&D. Without the resources from large companies directed to
small biotech companies under contractual agreements, innovation stagnation will result, and drug candidates will fail to reach late stages of clinical
development.
Likewise, if large companies obtain technologies and know-how whether
through purchases or licenses, the acquirers should still receive some benefits
under the incentive regime, as long as the acquirers continue and further their
R&D efforts. The burden is on the acquirers to demonstrate that they are
actually spending on additional R&D to bring the products to market. As we
have seen, there are high risks in racing to conduct the late phases of clinical
trials and obtain regulatory approval for COVID-19 vaccines. The incentive
regime must recognize and encourage such risks.
Eligible intellectual property income or gains would be tax-deferred only
if rolled over or reinvested within so many days (say 180 days) in qualified
R&D investment activities or funds. Of course, qualified R&D reinvestment
activities or funds would have to be specified, but such reinvestment could
include not only direct investment in the taxpayer's own R&D but also investments in qualified R&D funds set up by universities and foundations that
engage in important basic research. The option to roll over the income and
gains from intellectual property into basic research efforts is vital as U.S. government support for basic research has dwindled in recent years; yet, as we
just learned with the COVID-19 vaccines, basic research is an essential part
of the overall R&D landscape.
4. Costs and Benefits ofa DeferralRegime for R&D Income
A tax deferral regime for R&D income may be less costly for the government than the other two options discussed above (the complete tax exemption of income from intellectual property or a lower effective tax rate on such
income). The period of deferral should be specified and could be limited as
is the case with the deferral regime governing qualified opportunity zones;
recall from above that taxation of capital gains invested in a QOF is deferred
for a set number of years (until 2026).9" Deferral would not necessarily have
to be limited, however. In other words, taxation of qualified intellectual property income could be deferred until the taxpayer sells its investment in the
R&D activity or fund, in other words, cashes in its chips.
In contrast to the other options, a tax deferral regime would also ensure
continued investment in R&D activity. A rule completely excluding R&D
income from taxation, or a rule lowering the effective tax rate on R&D income, provides no guarantee that a beneficiary taxpayer will continue to engage in valuable R&D activity or reinvest R&D gains in other R&D efforts.
One can speculate that an income exemption or a lower effective tax rate on
R&D gains would encourage firms to respond by investing more in R&D.

19' See supra notes 140-143
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But only a deferral tax regime would mandate that result in order for the
regime's benefits to accrue to a taxpayer.
IV. Designing Ex Post R&D Tax Incentives for Individual Taxpayers
As noted earlier, corporate taxpayers do not receive preferential tax treat92
ment for their capital gains; individual taxpayers, in contrast, generally do.1'
But individuals must satisfy the requirements of either (1) the general characterization provisions in the Code or (2) some special characterization provision in the Code, which trumps the general characterization provisions.
By the mid-twentieth century, amateur inventors (but not professional inventors) had both tools at their disposal. Sales of their patents qualified as
"sales or exchanges" of "capital assets" and, thus, qualified for preferential
capital asset treatment under general characterization principles.193 Moreover,
a special characterization provision enacted in 1954, section 1235, guaranteed capital asset treatment to individual inventors (both amateur and professional inventors) who did not meet the requirements under the general
characterization provisions, provided such individuals satisfied certain statutory and administrative requirements.
In 2018, in a remarkable shift in tax policy, Congress made individual
inventors ineligible for capital asset treatment under long-standing general
characterization rules in the Code. Specifically, the TCJA amended the "cap94
ital asset" definition to exclude self-created patents and similar property.
Under the act, a patent, invention, model or design (patented or not), or
secret formula or process is not a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer
whose personal efforts created the property.195 Thus, gains from the sale of
self-created patents and similar property are no longer eligible for preferential
capital asset treatment under general characterization principles.196
1 92

See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text. For individuals, the top rate of tax on
0
capital gains (with certain exceptions) is 20% whereas the top rate on ordinary income is 37 /--a
significant rate differential for high earners. CompareI.RC. §§ 1(h) (capital gain rates) with 1(j)
(ordinary rates).
1" I.R.C. §§ 1222 (requiring a "sale or exchange" of a "capital asset" held for more than one
year); 1221 (defining a "capital asset"). The Code defines the term "capital asset" in negative terms
(i.e., all property held by a taxpayer except the property specifically listed). A longstanding exception from the capital asset definition is inventory or inventory-like property. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1).
Thus, patents developed by professional inventors have not qualified as capital assets. See Lockhart

v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 343, 346, 349-50 (3d Cir. 1958) (holding that an inventor who was
granted 37 patents over a 19-year period was in the business of selling and licensing his inventions;
such patents were not capital assets and payments received by him from the sale of just three patents
were taxable as ordinary income).

9 TCJA, Pub. L No. 115-97, § 13314(a), 131 Stat. at 2133.
1I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3), as amended by the TCJA.

9

'The stated policy reason for the change was that because "profits and losses arising from
everyday business operations [should] be characterized as ordinary income and loss, the general
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Interestingly, when Congress removed self-created patents and inventions
from capital asset characterization, it failed to repeal section 1235. As noted
above, section 1235 is a special characterization provision that acts like a safe
harbor for certain patent dispositions by individuals. When it applies, it provides statutory assurance to certain inventors that the sale of their inventions
will qualify for reduced capital gains rates, as opposed to ordinary income tax
rates, even if the sale would otherwise fail to qualify under general characterization principles (e.g., the transferor is a professional inventor or the invention has been held for less than one year).' 97
If section 1235 had been repealed in 2018, then individual inventors
would have absolutely no chance of receiving capital asset treatment on their
gains. But Congress kept it.198 And, thus, as the only exposttax incentive for
R&D, the special characterization rule has taken on a more significant role
in R&D tax policy.
By allowing individuals to qualify for capital asset treatment on the sale of
their inventions, Congress intended to encourage R&D that potentially leads
to patentable inventions. 199 Indeed, a stated policy goal underlying section
1235's enactment was "to provide an incentive to inventors to contribute to
the welfare of the Nation." 200 Unfortunately, section 1235's design limits its
effectiveness. For instance, the rule applies only to transfers of "all substantial
rights" to a patent, which, for example, does not include grants that are limited geographically or grants that are limited to fields of use within particular
definition of capital asset [should] be narrowly applied .... " H.R REP. No. 115-466, at 414
(2017) (Conf. Rep.). The silent, more likely justification for the change, however, was that it
helped pay for some of the expensive tax cuts in the TCJA. For criticism of this and other TCJA
changes affecting R&D, see Nguyen & Maine, supranote 1, at 1732-49. Interestingly, while selfcreated patents are not eligible for capital asset treatment under general principles, self-created musical copyrights are. See I.RC. § 1221(b)(3).
197 I.RC. § 1235(a) (providing that if all requirements are met, a patent transfer will be treated
as a sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than one year).
98
1 The House bill proposed repealing section 1235. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R 1, 115th
Cong. § 3312 (2017); see H.R REP. 115-409, at 272 (2017). The Senate version, however, kept
it, and the Conference Committee agreed with the Senate. H.R. REP. No. 115-466, at 414-15.
1"Section 1235 applies only to patents and not to other forms of intellectual property, such as
copyrights and trademarks. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 441 (1954), as reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5084. Although the Code does not define a patent for purposes of section
1235, the regulations provide that the term "patent" means a patent granted under the provisions
of Title 35 of the U.S. Code, as well as any foreign patent granting rights generally similar to those
under a U.S. patent. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a). Of importance, the regulations provide that it is not
necessary that the patent or patent application for the invention be in existence if the requirements
of section 1235 are otherwise met. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a). Thus, section 1235 can apply to patentable
technology for which a formal application has not yet been made. This is significant since transferors often grant ownership of perfected but unpatented inventions before the patent or patent
application is in existence.
200 S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 439, as reprintedin 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5082.
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trades or industries. 2 01 Further, the rule's favorable capital asset treatment ap-

plies only if the transferor is a "holder" of the patent, defined narrowly as any
individual whose personal efforts created the property and who would qualify
as the "original and first" inventor under the patent laws. 202 In many cases,
20 3
these and other hurdles to capital asset treatment can be insurmountable.
In light of section 1235's design flaws, yet increased significance as an
R&D tax policy tool after the TCJA, Congress should consider design enhancements. Recommended below are several suggestions to expand the
scope of section 1235 to cover more taxpayers and more patent transactions
in the hopes of achieving the provision's original goals of incentivizing R&D
activity and harmonizing ex ante and ex post R&D tax incentives.
A. Expand the Taxpayers Elgiblefor CapitalAsset Treatment
1. Expand Section 1235 to Cover Non-IndividualCreators
Section 1235's favorable capital asset treatment applies only if the taxpayer-transferor is a statutorily defined "holder" of the patent. The holder of
a patent is defined narrowly as (1) any individual whose personal efforts created the patent property and who would qualify as the "original and first"
inventor, or joint inventor, under the patent laws 2" or (2) any other individual who acquired his or her interest in the patent property from the original
inventor in exchange for money or money's worth prior to the actual reduction to practice of the invention covered by the patent (e.g., a "financial
backer"). 2 ' There are several problems with this narrow construct of who can
benefit from the special rule.
Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1).
I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1); Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i) (referring to Title 35 of the Code).
203 The capital gain benefits of section 1235 are not available when an individual transfers a
patent to a "related person." I.R.C. § 1235(d); see S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 441, as reprintedin
201

202

1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5084 (noting the limitation was added to "prevent possible abuses arising
from the sale of patents within essentially the same economic group"). A transferor and a corporation in which the transferor holds a 25% or greater ownership interest are treated as related. I.R.C.
%§267(b), 707(b), 1235(d). As illustrated by a recent case, courts might find proscribed control
even in the absence of a 25% stock ownership interest in the transferee. See Cooper v. Commis-

sioner, 143 T.C. 194 (2014), a'd, 877 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[I]f a patent holder
exercises control over the recipient corporation such that, in effect, there has not been a transfer of
all substantial rights in the subject patent(s), then the requirements of § 1235(a) are not met, even
if the documents describing the transfer formally assign all substantial rights.").
24
20 5

I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1); Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i) (referring to Title 35 of the Code).
I.R.C. § 1235(b)(2); Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(ii). Payments for patent application fees and liv-

ing expenses qualify as consideration for this purpose. See, e.g., Meiners v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.
653 (1964), acq., 1967-2 C.B. 1. The term "actual reduction to practice," as used in section
1235(b)(2), has the same meaning as it does under the patent laws. Reg. § 1.1235-2(e) (referring
2
to 35 U.S.C. § 10 (g)). Generally, an invention is reduced to actual practice when it has been
tested and operated successfully under normal operating conditions. This may occur either before
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As an initial observation, only individuals can qualify for section 1235's
safe harbor treatment. Startup companies and small research entities whose
employees conduct their research do not qualify. 2" This is ironic since such
companies are critical to economic growth in the United States; indeed they
constitute 51% of firms engaged in innovation. 207 Technology-based startups
are particularly important, as they account for more than 70% of business
R&D investment and nearly 60% of R&D jobs in the United States. 20 ' Recently Congress expanded the R&D tax credit for startups and small businesses. 209 Expanding section 1235's scope to cover such entities would better
align front-end and back-end R&D tax incentives. Of course, guaranteeing
capital asset treatment for corporate startups under section 1235 would be
irrelevant for tax rate purposes, as all corporate income (both ordinary income
and capital gain income) is currently taxed at the same rate.210 Nevertheless,
capital asset treatment is often sought by companies since their capital losses
are deductible in any given year only to the extent of their capital gains. 211 In
other words, to the extent company income is characterized as capital gain,
any capital losses the company might possess will offset that income.

or after application for a patent but cannot occur later than the earliest time that commercial exploitation of the invention occurs. Id. For a decision finding holder status, see Meiners, 42 T.C.
at 658. For a decision not finding holder status, see Juda v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 1075, 107879 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding a limited partnership did not qualify as "holder" because it did not
acquire an interest in the patents in exchange for consideration paid to the inventor prior to actual
reduction to practice of the patented invention).
206 Partnerships and other pass-through entities, such as limited liability companies (LLCs) are
an exception. Each member of a partnership who is an individual may qualify as a holder as to his
or her pro-rata share of a patent owned by the partnership. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(2). For private
letter rulings holding that an inventor who filed patents with two co-inventors and formed an LLC
with them retained his status as a "holder" for purposes of section 1235, and thereby concluding
that gain recognized by the LLC on disposition of the patent rights qualified for capital asset treatment to the members, see P.L.R. 2005-06-008-009, 2005-06-019 (Oct. 20, 2004).
207 Se J. John Wu & Robert D. Atkinson, How Technology-Based Starr-UpsSupport U.S.
Economic Growth, INFo. TECH. & INNOvATION FOuND., at 5-12 (Nov. 2017), http://
www2.itif.org/2017-technology-based-start-ups.pdf?ga=2.208635282.1482348089.151189129
1-735226115.1509988589 [https://perma.cc/5MJZ-S2WZ].
208 Id at 6 (focusing on "10 technology-based industries in manufacturing and services: pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical device manufacturers, computer and electronic manufacturers,
semiconductor machinery manufacturers, semiconductor component manufacturers, aerospace
manufacturers, data processing services, computer systems and design services, software publishing
services, and R&D-performing services").
209 Starting in 2016, some startups and small businesses can use the tax credit to offset payroll
taxes.
2 0 I.R.C. § 41(h).
I.R.C. § 11 (imposing a flat 21% tax rate on corporate taxable income).
2 11
1 RC. § 1211(a).
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Expand Section 1235 to Cover Employers Who Have "Equitable"
Ownership ofPatents
A significant anomaly with section 1235 as currently designed is that an
inventor's employer, even if an individual, does not qualify for the provision's
special capital asset treatment. As noted earlier, an individual qualifies if his
personal efforts created the patent property and he would qualify as the "original and first" inventor under the patent laws. Under this approach, an inventor's employer would not qualify "even though he may be the equitable
owner of the patent by virtue of an employment relationship with the inventor."2 2 Also as noted, a financial backer can qualify.21 3 However, the statute
makes clear that a financial backer cannot be the employer of the inventor
nor be related to him or her.2 14
Excluding employers from section 1235's benefit seems incongruous with
present ex ante R&D tax incentives for such employers. Indeed, both the
R&D tax deduction and tax credit become available to employers whose employees invent. Qualified research expenses eligible for the tax credit, for instance, include in-house research expenses, which include wages paid to an
employee for qualified services performed by such an employee. 2 " Expanding
section 1235 to apply to an inventor's employer would provide harmony between ex ante and expost R&D tax incentives.
More importantly, excluding employers from section 1235's safe harbor
treatment ignores the fundamental patent law relating to inventorship and
2.

2

S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 439-40, as reprintedin 1954 U.S.C.CA.N. at 5082-83.
Harsha Reddy, Intellectual Property: Exploitdon and Disposition, 558-3rd TAx MGT.

21 3

PORT. (BNA) II.A.1.b.(1)(c) (2021) ("By extending § 1235 treatment to financial backers, Congress recognized that the road to a successful invention is often paved with inadequate financing
and the sacrifice by the inventor of gainful endeavors. Congress, however, also wanted to limit the
application of§ 1235 to those who contribute before the invention is brought to commercial readiness.").
21
I.R.C. § 1235(b); Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(ii). The requirement that a financial backer be neither the employer of the original inventor nor related to the inventor "must be satisfied at the time
when the substantive rights as to the interest to be acquired are determined, and at the time when
the consideration in money or money's worth to be paid is definitely fixed." Id For example,
[i]f prior to the actual reduction to practice of an invention an individual who is neither
the employer of the inventor nor related to him agrees to pay the inventor a sum of
money definitely fixed as to amount in return for an undivided one-half interest in rights
to a patent and at a later date, when such individual has become the employer of the
inventor, he pays the definitely fixed sum of money pursuant to the earlier agreement,
such individual will not be denied the status of a holder because of such employment
relationship.

Id2 15

I.RC. § 41(b)(2)(A). The term "qualified services" is defined as services consisting of (1) engaging in qualified research or (2) engaging in direct supervision or direct support of research activities that constitute qualified research. I.RC. § 41(b)(2)(B).
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the relationship between inventor-employees and their employers. As explained by the Supreme Court in Stanford v. Roche MolecularSystems, Inc.,
inventors under patent law are individuals; therefore, the USPTO can only
grant patents to individuals, not entities. 216 Individual inventors today are
typically employed at small and large companies, and they are hired to invent.
Under employment agreements or handbooks, individual inventors assign
their patents and all other types of intellectual property to their employers
because the employers have already compensated the employees for their efforts. 2 17 Through collaboration in the workplace and the use of the employer's facilities, the employees disclose their inventions to the employer.
Thereafter, the employers spend financial resources to prosecute and procure
the patent applications upon the employee's disclosure and cooperation. The
patents are subsequently issued by the USPTO with the employees listed as
inventors and the employers as assignees. Unquestionably, the employers
arise as the equitable owners of the patents and should be qualified for section
1235 treatment.

Illustratively, IBM has led among all companies in the number of patents
issued by the USPTO for several decades. 218 IBM's researchers are the inventors, and IBM is the assignee on all the patents. 219 IBM, as the employer,
owns the patents under patent law, not the inventors. 220 Moreover, according
to normative transactions, third parties negotiate for purchases or licenses to
use the patents with IBM, not IBM's inventors, because IBM stands as the
rightful owner of the patents.2 2 1 Whenever an infringement action occurs,
563 U.S. at 785-86.
217 See Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 408 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding
that, in a case in which an at-will employee did not have an employment contract, the employee
still had the obligation to assign the patents to the employer because the employer hired the employee to invent and compensated him for his efforts and paid for the prosecution of the patent
application).
21
SeeManny Schecter, IBM Has Led In U.S. Patentsfor 25 Years: Five Lessons It Learned
TECH. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://techonomy.com/2018/03/ibm-led-u-s-patents-25-years-five-lessons-learned/ [https://perma.cc/6JR6-J3DZ] ("[T]he United States Patent and Trademark Office
announced that IBM was awarded more U.S. patents than any other company for the 25th consecutive year. This is a remarkable record that is unlikely ever to be surpassed, and IBM has a lot
to teach other companies.").
219 The USPTO announced IBM, not IBM's employees, as the owners of newly issued patents.
216

See id
220

See id Also, IBM inventors know that they are not the owners of the patents and that their
employer IBM is the rightful owner. See Dario Gil, IBM's Innovation: Topping the US Patent
List For 28 Years Running, IBM (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2021/
01/ibm-patent-leadership-2020/ [https://perma.cc/9GPU-8CQ8].
221

See Jack Ellis, The Inside Take on IBM's HybridPatentSales Strategyand How It Helps to

Create Value for Big Blue, IAM (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.iam-media.com/copyright/inside[https://perma.cc/
take-ibms-hybrid-patent-sales-strategy-and-how-it-helps-create-value-big-blue
Y3XD-36HB] (reporting that six out of the ten largest US IPOs by valuation involved companies
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IBM and not the inventors decide whether to bring an infringement action
and whether to settle any lawsuit.222 Similarly, in a university setting, the researchers receive a salary and use university facilities to conduct extensive ex23
University technology offices often
periments that may lead to patents.

prosecute the patent applications, which list the researchers as inventors and
the universities as assignees." 4 The universities then negotiate license deals
and share some of the profits generated from the licensed patents with the
inventors. Clearly, universities should not be excluded from section 1235
treatment; but because most universities are tax-exempt entities, any issue related to capital asset treatment is irrelevant. 221 Nevertheless, the norms of understanding with respect to the original owners of patents in the employment
context are well established: the employers are the original and equitable owners. Accordingly, the employers should be included within the scope of section 1235 treatment.
3. Expand Section 1235 to CoverEmployees Hired to Invent
Equally problematic to the fact that employers currently do not qualify for
section 1235 treatment is the fact that many of their employees who invent

that had purchased patents from IBM and that IBM's patent law team is responsible for the "company's patent, copyright and know-how monetization activity," including patent sales and licenses
to "seal broader commercial deals or offer value-adds to its enterprise services customers-many of
which are high-growth tech startups aiming for an IPO").
222See IBM Announces Serdement With Airbnb for Patent Iawsuit, YAHoo! FIN. (Dec. 28,
2020), https://www.yahoo.com/now/ibm-announces-settlement-airbnb-patent-150503853.html
[https://perma.cc/M9QN-D7SR] ("Earlier in March, IBM sued Airbnb for the infringement of
its four e-commerce-related patents in the United States District Court of Delaware. Also, IBM
proposed to restrict Airbnb from using its technology along with compensation for the damages
due to the violation. Per the company, it had been trying to negotiate with Airbnb to reach a patent
license agreement since May 2014, but without success, which prompted it to file a lawsuit against
the latter.").
23 See Samantha Stainburn, Who Owns Your Great Idea? N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2008),
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/education/edlife/whoseidea-t.html
469G-DT7Z] ("Colleges and universities own the ideas and technologies invented by the people
who work for them, including professors and graduate students who are paid to do research. Most
universities also own inventions created by students using a significant amount of their resources,
are undergraduates.").
even
22 if the inventors

4 See id

225 ee Tax Exemption for Universidesand Colleges, InternalRevenue CodeSection 501(c)(3)
and Section 115, Ass'N OF AM. U. (Mar. 2014), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU
%20Fies/Key%20Issues/Taxation%20%26%20Finance/Tax-Exempt-Status-of-Universities-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GQ9-3TJ3]("Income from activities that are substantially related to
the purpose of an institution's tax exemption, charitable contributions received, and investment
income are not subject to federal income tax. The Federal tax code classifies tax-exempt colleges
and universities and their foundations as public charities. Consequently, they are not subject to tax
on investment income, payout requirements, or other rules that apply to private foundations.").
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also fail to qualify. As a general rule, section 1235 does not apply to a transfer
by an employee to an employer of the rights to any invention by such employee if the transfer was in exchange for compensation pursuant to an employment contract.226 The reason for this exception is that an employee who
is hired by an employer to invent cannot make a transfer of inventions in
which he or she has no rights. An employee paid by an employer to invent
receives compensation for services rendered (taxable as ordinary income), and
not consideration for the assignment of inventions constituting capital assets
(taxable as capital gains under section 1235).
This presents an interesting double-whammy in hired-to-invent situations.
An employee hired to invent cannot benefit from the section 1235 tax incentive, and as discussed above, the inventor's employer cannot benefit from section 1235 either. The contractual arrangement is quite common in the current innovation landscape, but the tax system's only ex post R&D tax
incentive fails to apply to either player.
The rule for employees also creates added complexities to the tax regime
and raises potential factual disputes between taxpayers and the government.
Whether payment received by an inventor-employee from his or her employer is treated as compensation for service rendered by the employee or as
proceeds derived from the transfer of patent rights is, of course, a question of
fact. 227 Consideration is given to not only all of the facts and circumstances
of the employment relationship but also whether the amount of such payments depends upon the production, sale, or use by, or the value to, the employer of the patent rights transferred by the employee. 228 If an employee
shares in the proceeds from the sale or licensing of the patent and receives a
percentage of royalties in addition to wages, courts are likely to treat the payments as consideration for the transfer of patent rights, thereby entitling the
employee to capital asset treatment under section 1235.229 If, however, an
2 26

Reg. § 1.1235-1(c)(2) (providing that "[p]ayments received by an employee as compensation
for services rendered as an employee under an employment contract requiring the employee to
transfer to the employer the rights to any invention by such employee are not attributable to a
transfer
to which section 1235 applies").
22
7

Id

228
229

Id
See McClain v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 841, 849-50 (1963), acq., 1964-2 C.B. 3 (holding

that payments received were entitled to capital asset treatment even though the parties had signed
an agreement requiring the employee to assign inventions developed during the course of employment partly in return for wages); Chilton v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 552, 554, 563 (1963), acq.,
1964-2 C.B. 3 (holding that payments received were entitled to capital asset treatment even though
the employment agreement provided that the employee shall "devote his whole time and apply his
experience and his inventive ability to the problems, improvements, and developments relating to
the company's products"); Speicher v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 938, 944-45 (1957) (holding that
percentage payments received by an employee for the transfer of an invention that the employee
had worked on for many years (perfected but not patented) were part of the purchase price rather
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employee is to receive a fixed salary or a percentage of the employer's earnings
regardless of whether the patented invention is licensed or sold, courts are
likely to treat the amounts received as compensation for services taxable as
ordinary income. 23 0

In determining whether an inventor-employee was "hired to invent,"
courts look closely at whether payments to the employee are a function of his
or her services. 231 If the contract contains no provision for services to be rendered or provides that the employee is required to render only advisory services incidental to the transfer (perhaps because the patented invention is
technical or intricate), courts are likely to determine that payments received
are attributable to the sale of patent rights rather than compensation for services. 32 On the other hand, if the employment agreement requires the employee to assign patented inventions to the employer and does not obligate
the employer to pay for the patented inventions, later payments may be
viewed as an award or compensation for the employee's continuing contributions to the employer as part of his or her employment.2 3 1 If the employment

than compensation), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. See also Spence v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 556 (Ct.

Cl.2 1957).
30 Downs v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 533, 537-38 (1968), acq., 1968-2 C.B. 2 (holding that
section 1235 did not apply when the employee received payments at a fixed monthly rate to reduce
to practical application a concept that was originated by the employer); Komarek v. Commissioner,

26 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 526-27, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 67,112, at 571 (1967) (holding that the percentage payments received by the employee were additional compensation for services and should
be treated as ordinary income); Dean v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1321, 1325-26,
T.C.M. (P-H) 1 66,258, at 1483-84 (1966) (concluding that the employee transferred his rights
in the patents in return for a generous employment contract and holding that the payments under
the contract were compensation for his services).
231 See Blum v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 281, 287-88 (3d Cir. 1950) (holding that the em-

ployee had been hired to invent), a'g 11 T.C. 101 (1948). See also McClain, 40 T.C. at 848-50
(holding that the amount received by the employee was capital gain although an agreement signed
as a condition of employment required the employee to transfer all possible future inventions;
subsequent to the assignment, the employer began a program of paying employee-inventors certain
percentages of any income received as the result of the sale or licensing of employee inventions to

third parties); Hill v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1056, 1061-62, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 63,211,
at 1205-06 (1963) (holding that royalty payments to the employee were capital gain in a case in
which the payments were made under a plan that existed prior to the employment date and the
employee was not hired to invent).

32 See Gable v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1433-34, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 74,312,
at 1359-61 (1974) (finding that the services provided by the inventor were for purposes of solving
technical problems, not developing new invention, and the payments received by the inventor were
for the patent transfer). See a/so Heil Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 989 (1962), acq., 1963-2

C.B. 3; Hessert v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 932, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 43,187 (1943).
3 Lehman v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 431, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that $30,000
awarded to the employee-chemist was not for the transfer of a patented invention, but instead was
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agreement provides that no further consideration is due to the employee for
inventions developed during employment, then payment received is not
based on the value of the invention to the employer. 2M Nevertheless, in some
cases, courts find that payments received are both partially attributable to the
sale of patent rights (capital gain) and partially represent compensation for
services rendered (ordinary income).2 31
There are many "ifs" in the analysis just described, which creates uncertainty for employees engaged in valuable R&D. As illustrated, numerous
courts have had to address section 1235's application to employees, even in
recent years. 236 Additionally, the government must provide administrative
guidance. 237 Consequently, the rule can produce unexpected tax consequences. For example, section 1235 may apply to university employees who
transfer patent rights to their employer-universities in exchange for a percentage of the employer's future licensing revenue (that is, a royalty sharing agreement or RSA). 23 ' But when payments from an RSA are made to the employee's "research account," unexpected tax results may occur. 239 Current
advice to tax planners is that university agreements with faculty members

compensation for the employee's continuing contributions to the company as part of the employment; although the employment agreement required the employee to transfer the patent rights, it
did234not obligate the employer to pay the employee for the transfer).
See Beausoleil v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 244, 249-50 (1976).
235 Glen O'Brien Movable Partition Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 492, 505 (1978),
acq.,
1979-2 C.B. 1 (holding that $10,000 of a $25,000 payment that the employee received was attributable to the employee's sale of patent rights, whereas the remainder represented compensation
for the transfer of advisory services and technical know-how); Spnce, 156 F. Supp. at 558-59
(holding that five percent of sales in excess of $300,000 was capital gain and three percent of sales
was compensation for services, where the agreement provided that the president of a corporation
who transferred his patent rights was to receive eight percent of sales in excess of $300,000 annually, but only five percent when he ceased to be president).
236
For a 2019 case example, see Meggs v. Commissioner, 117 T.C.M (CCH) 1023, 2019
T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2019-5. The court had to decide whether any of the payments under a contract
addendum were in exchange for intellectual property or were for some other purpose. The Service
did not dispute that intellectual property was transferred or that the transfer of the intellectual
property met the requirements of section 1235. The Service, however, did dispute whether the
payments made under the contract addendum were made in consideration for that transfer, which
was necessary to receive capital asset treatment under section 1235. Although there was no explicit
reference to the transfer of the intellectual property in the addendum, the court found credible
evidence that the payments were consideration for the rights to the intellectual property.
237 See, e.g., TAM. 2002-49-002 (Aug. 8, 2002) (concluding that a university professor was
entitled
to capital asset treatment under section 1235 for royalties received from the university).
23 8

Id

239See Benjamin A. Davidson et al., Just Put It in My Research Account: Transfers of
RSA

Rights, 157 TAX NOTEs (TA) 1791 (Dec. 18, 2017).
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should be reviewed to determine whether they meet the requirements under
20
section 1235 for capital asset treatment.
In sum, a solution to the concerns raised here would be to expand section
1235's application beyond the current, limited category of beneficiaries. Consideration could be given to extending its application to non-individual creators, including employers who have "equitable" ownership of patents. Consideration could also be given to extending its application to employees who
are hired to invent. In extending section 1235's capital asset treatment to both
employers and employees with respect to revenue generated from patents, the
regime would recognize that the individuals who invent and the entities that
enable patented inventions should be rewarded. Additionally, in light of
China's patent law favoring employee-inventors with statutory remuneration
241
to promote innovations in China, our proposed solution of expanding section 1235 to cover both employer and employee-inventors would situate the
242
United States in a more competitive position in the current global tech war.
B. ExpandPatent Transfers Eligiblefor CapitalAsset Treatment

Section 1235 applies only to a transfer of all substantial rights to a patent
23
or an undivided interest therein. The term "all substantial rights" is limited
and refers to all rights (whether or not then held by the grantor) that are of
value at the time the rights to the patent (or an undivided interest in it) are
transferred. 2" There are some transfers that logically should not fit the definition, and, thus, should not be eligible for capital asset treatment. For example, the grant of a patent that is limited in duration by the terms of the agreement to a period less than the remaining life of the patent does not, and
should not, qualify. 245 Likewise, the grant of less than all the claims or inventions covered by the patent that exists and possesses value at the time of the
2
grant does not, and should not, qualify. " And, no one would disagree that
240

See Kyle Richard, Does the Tax Cuts andJobsAct Affect University Tech Transfer? 159
TAxNOTES (TA) 1927 (June 25, 2018).
24 See supranotes 106-108 and accompanying text.
2 42

US-China Tech War: Everything You Need to KnowAbout the US-China Tech War and

Its Impact, S. CHINA MORN. POST (Apr. 23, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/tech/techwar/article/3130587/us-china-tech-war-everyddng-you-need-know-about-us-china-tech-war
[https://perma.cc/8VMC-6BLTI; Matt Henry & Matthew Carney, Chinaandthe USAre Locked
in a Superpower Tech War to "Win the 21st Century, "ABC NEWS (July 7, 2021, 2:00 PM, updated 8:44 PM), https:// www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-08/trump-facebook-twitter-china-us-superpower-tech-war/1002 73812 [https://perma.cc/DA23-KC49].
243
2 44

I.R.C. § 1235(a); Reg. § 1.1235-2(b).
Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1). Whether or not all substantial rights to a patent are transferred in a

transaction depends on the circumstances surrounding the entire transaction and not the particular
terminology used in the transfer instrument. Id.
2
"'Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(ii).
2 46
Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(iv).
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a transfer in which the grantor retained the right to terminate or revoke the
transfer at will should not qualify.247
Nevertheless, there are several patent transfers that presently do not qualify
for section 1235 treatment, but that, in our opinion, should qualify. These
include (1) the grant of a patent in which nonexclusive rights are outstanding;
(2) the grant of a patent that is limited geographically within the country of
issuance; and (3) the grant of a patent that is limited to fields of use within
particular trades or industries. Each is considered below.
1. Transfers Subject to Nonexclusive Licenses
It is well settled that section 1235 does not apply to the transfer of all
patent rights held by the transferor if there are nonexclusive rights in the patent that are outstanding. The reason is because the Treasury regulations
clearly provide that "all substantial rights to a patent" means "all rights
(whether or not then held by the grantor) that are of value at the time the
rights to the patent are transferred."2 4
Courts that have directly considered the issue have concluded that a prior
license (whether exclusive or nonexclusive) constituted a substantial right
such that the licensor could not be said to have transferred all substantial
rights in a subsequent conveyance subject to the earlier license. In Blake v.
Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit held that section 1235 did not apply to a
transfer of rights in remaining fields of use after a prior transfer (exclusive
license subject to a field-of-use restriction) to the same transferee. 4 1 The
Sixth Circuit ruled that under section 1235, "all substantial rights" means all
rights then in existence, whether or not held by the transferor.25 0 In First
National Trust & Savings Bank of San Diego v. United States, the district
court similarly concluded that section 1235 did not apply to a second transfer
of bifurcated patent rights.25' According to the court:
The conveyance of a nonexclusive license . . . is not a transfer of a capital
asset; nor, in our opinion, is a subsequent transfer of a so-called exclusive
license of the same rights, but subject to the first license. That the end result
247

Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(4). The regulations, however, provide examples of two rights that may
be retained by the holder (1) legal title for the purpose of securing performance or payment by the
transferee and (2) rights in the property that are not inconsistent with the passage of ownership,
such as a security interest (e.g., a vendor's lien) or a reservation in the nature of a condition subsequent such as a provision for forfeiture or account of nonperformance. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i)(ii).2 4
Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (emphasis added).

F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'g 6 7 T.C. 7 (1976).
Id at 734-35; but see Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl.

249615

250

1967) (concluding that "a sale is not defeated because the agreement was subject to an existing
limited license previously granted").
25 200 F. Supp. 274 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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of such latter conveyance may accomplish a divestiture of all substantial
rights which the transferor had in the patent at the time, is not the proper
52
criterion. 2

The Tax Court once questioned the validity of the Regulation and this
approach. 2" The Service, however, has made clear that the Regulation is controlling for purposes of section 1235,254 and caselaw, as discussed above, has
sanctioned that approach. Under present law, for section 1235 to apply there
must be a transfer of all substantial rights to the patent, not only those rights
held by the transferor immediately prior to the conveyance.
The scope of section 1235 should be expanded to cover complete transfers
of patents even if subject to a nonexclusive license. It is not uncommon for
an outstanding license to already exist at the time a transferor wishes to convey all remaining rights to another party (subject to the previous agreement).
Moreover, in recent years, the practice of patent transfers subject to outstanding nonexclusive licenses has become the tech industry norm. Illustratively,
there are more than 1,400 tech companies that have joined the License on
Transfer (LOT) Network. 25" Google, Canon, SAP, Newegg, Dropbox, and
Asana are examples of companies that have joined the LOT Network and
2
listed 300,000 patents into the LOT portfolio. As members of LOT, when-

ever another member sells or transfers a patent to a third party, the transac257
tion is subject to a license of the transferred patent to all the members. The
reason for such a patent-transfer-subject-to-license scheme is that LOT members want to avoid lawsuits brought by third parties who are patent assertion
entities (PAEs). 258 PAEs are known to demand payments through asserting
patent infringement suits against tech companies causing companies to incur
large litigation costs. 259 The Federal Trade Commission's PAE Study reveals

2 Id. at 281-82.
2 53

MacDonald v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 840 (1971), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 2.

254

Rev. Rul. 78-328, 1978-2 C.B. 215.
Prevent UnwantedLitigation While Preservingthe Use of Your Patents LOT NETWORK,
https://lotnet.com/ [https://perma.cc/8NPX-DFHD] ("Join the community of 1400+ global in255

dustry leaders who have collaboratively immunized themselves against lawsuits from Patent Assertion Entities").
2
See James M. Rice, The Defense PatentPlaybook, 30 BERK. TECH. L.J. 725,773 (2015).
257

SeeAndrew C. Michaels, Patent Transferand the Bundle ofRights, 83 BROOK. L. REv. 933,

934 (2018) (describing the LOT transfer and license strategy for its members). See also Brian J.
Love et al., An EmpiricalLook at the "Brokered"Markerfor Patents, 83 MO. L. REV. 359, 40506 (2018) (identifying LOT Networks as an example of "self-help solutions that facilitate the "mutual258disarmament" of patent assets among operating companies").

See Love, supra note 257, at 405-06.

2 59

FED. TRADE COMM'N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTrrY ACTIVTY: AN FTC STUDY 15

(Oct. 2016) [hereinafter PAE STUDY] (a PAE refers to "a firm that primarily acquires patents and
seeks to generate revenue by asserting them against accused infringers"). The PAE Study found

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 75, No. 2

INCENTIVIZING INNOVATION

405

that "nuisance infringement litigation [brought by some PAEs] can tax judicial resources and divert attention away from productive business behavior."260 Accordingly, to act collectively against PAEs who acquire patents
through purchases and transfers from a member of the LOT Network, the
other members of LOT enjoy automatic immunity against the acquirer's lawsuits involving the transferred patent for the life of that patent.261
In short, section 1235 should apply if a taxpayer is transferring all the
rights it holds at the time of conveyance. The fact that the taxpayer previously
granted nonexclusive rights to someone else should not matter. The same
approach should apply if the taxpayer acquired the patent already subject to
a nonexclusive license and the taxpayer otherwise satisfies the requirements
of section 1235.
Support for our recommendation can be found in the legislative history to
section 1235. According to the legislative history, the "all substantial rights"
test of section 1235 "recognizes the basic criteria of a 'sale or exchange' under
existing law" (i.e., general characterization provisions).2 6 2 Interestingly, under
the general characterization provisions of the Code, transfers of patents already subject to a nonexclusive license do qualify for "sale or exchange" treatment. In MacDonaldv. Commissioner,263 the Tax Court held that the transfer of all the rights a taxpayer ever held in a patent, but did not include all
two types of PAEs that use distinctly different business models. One type, referred to in
the report as Portfolio PAEs, were strongly capitalized and purchased patents outright.
They negotiated broad licenses, covering large patent portfolios, frequently worth more
than $1 million. The second, more common, type, referred to in the report as Litigation
PAEs, frequently relied on revenue sharing agreements to acquire patents. They overwhelmingly filed infringement lawsuits before securing licenses, which covered a small
number of patents and were generally less valuable.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Report Sheds New Light on How Patent Assertion Entities Operate; Recommends Patent Litigation Reforms (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2016/10/ftc-report-sheds-new-light-how-patent-assertion-entities-operate
[https://perma.c/3NW5-NQNN]. PAEs are also referred to derogatorily as "patent trolls."
Michaels, supranote 257, at 933-34 (explaining patent trolls). See alsoKristen Osenga, Formerly
ManufacturingEntides:Piercingthe "PatentTroll"Rhetorc, 47 CONN. L. REv. 435, 439 (2014);
Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking PatentAssertion Entities (PAE), 99 MINN. L. REv.
649 (2014); Michael Risch, ParentTrollMyths, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 457 (2012).
260
PAE Study, supra note 259, at 9. The PAE Study found that "royalties typically yielded by
Litigation PAE licenses were less than the lower bounds of early-stage litigation costs. This data is
consistent with nuisance litigation, in which defendant companies decide to settle based on the
cost of litigation rather than the likelihood of their infringement." Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, supa note 259.
261 See How We ProtecrMembers;LOT NETWORK, https://lotnet.com/how-we-protect-members/ [https://perma.cc/3GX2-RPWS] (describing the benefits of becoming a LOT Network
member).
12 S .REP. No. 83-1622, at 439-40, asreprintedin1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5082-83.
263

55 T.C. 840 (1971), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 2.
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then existing rights in the patent because the patent was already subject to a
nonexclusive license, may qualify for capital asset treatment under the general
2
characterization provisions of the Code. " In Revenue Ruling 78-328,265 the
Service addressed a situation similar to that in MacDonaldand held that a
transfer could qualify for capital asset treatment under general characterization provisions. The Service noted that the transferor acquired the patent already subject to a license, transferred no interest in the patent prior to its sale,
and thus transferred all the rights it had ever held in the patent.
If a preexisting nonexclusive license is not fatal in satisfying the "sale or
exchange" requirement under general characterization principles, it should
not be fatal in obtaining capital asset treatment under section 1235. This is
especially true as the legislative history suggests that the transfer of "all substantial rights" should equate to a "sale or exchange" under general characterization principles.
2. Transfers That Are Limited Geographically
Under current Treasury regulations, patent transfers that are limited geographically within the country of issuance do not qualify for capital asset
treatment under section 1235.2" The Tax Court in Keuneman v. Commis2
sioner267 reversed its earlier decision in Rodgers v. Commissioner,6" which
had held that the regulation involving geographical limitations was invalid.
Thus, a transfer subject to a geographical limitation will not qualify for section 1235 treatment.

This approach, however, fails to recognize realities in the patent marketplace. Grants with geographical restrictions reflect the understanding of both
the grantor and the grantee that the grantee's capability to use and commercialize the patent may be limited to a particular geographical territory.269 The
grantor may want to transfer the technology to multiple grantees, each of

26 4

I.R.C. § 1231. Section 1235 did not apply in MacDonaldbecause the transferor was not an

individual.
265 1978-2 C.B. 215.
2
" Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i). A transfer subject to a geographical limitation will not qualify for
section 1235 treatment, unless the invention only has value in that geographical area (retained
rights are valueless) and all other criteria are met. Only transfers limited geographically within the
country of issues are precluded from qualifying under section 1235. Therefore, the transfer of rights
to a U.S. patent, while retaining foreign rights (foreign patent on U.S. invention) is not a precluded
transfer in the regulations.
26768
268 51
2 69

T.C. 609 (1977), af'd 628 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1980).
T.C. 927 (1969).

See Frank X. Curd, Technology Licensing Strategic Issues Every Licensor and Licensee
Should Consider, in INTELECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITIVE RESTRIcTIONS ch. 64.8
(2018).
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whom can maximize the value of the patent in a particular territory. 270 Similarly, a grantee does not want to acquire all of the rights under the patent if
the grantee does not have the capacity and feasibility to exploit the patent
outside a particular territory. 271
Moreover, the Federal Circuit in Rite-Hie Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc. recognized that "a conveyance of legal title" by the patent owner "can be made
only of the entire patent, an undivided part or share of the entire patent, or
all rights under the patent in a specified geographical region of the United
States." 272 All three types of transfers would entitle the assignees to sue others
for patent infringement.273 In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit relied
on the Supreme Court's famous opinion in Waterman v. Mackenzie decided
in 1891.274 The Waterman court recognized the transfer of a patent subject
to geographical restrictions as an assignment of legal title in the patent and
further recognized that the transferee could bring an infringement suit without joining the transferor.2 75 In light of the patent marketplace and patent
law, transfers subject to a geographical limitations should be within the scope
of section 1235 treatment.
Regulatory restrictions on geographical limitations is also inconsistent
with the approach taken under the general characterization provisions of the
Code. Prior to the enactment of section 1235 in 1954, courts concluded that
transfers with geographical limitations could qualify for "sale or exchange"
treatment so long as the entire bundle of rights regarding such geographical
designation were transferred. In Watson v. United States, for instance, the
Tenth Circuit noted that "[i]t is a firmly accepted principle of law that if the
patentee conveys by an instrument in writing the exclusive right to make, use,
and vend the invention ... within a specified area within the United States,
the conveyance constitutes an assignment of the patent" eligible for capital
asset treatment. 276
270
27 1

1d

d

56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
3M at 1551-52. See also Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1117
(Fed.Cir.1996).
272
27

274 Rite-fire Corp., 56 F.3d at 1551 (citing Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255
(1891)).
275
See Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255 ("The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing,
assign, grant, and convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make,
use, and vend the invention throughout the United States; or, 2d, an undivided part or share of
that exclusive right; or, 3d, the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified
part of the United States.... A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests is an assignment,
properly speaking, and vests in the assignee a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to
sue infringers: in the second case, jointly with the assignor, in the first and third cases, in the name
of the assignee alone.").
276 222 F.2d 689, 690 (10th Cir.
1955).
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If a geographical limitation does not preclude capital asset treatment under
general characterization principles, we see no reason it should preclude capital
asset treatment under section 1235. This is especially true now after the
TCJA, which left section 1235 as the only exposttax incentive for individual
inventors.

3. Transfers ThatAre Limited to Fields of Use
It is not uncommon for a patent transfer to include a field-of-use limitation (i.e., a restriction that the patent granted can only be used by the transferee in a certain industry). Section 1235 generally does not apply to such
transfers. 27
Field-of-use limitations have generated considerable, and conflicting, litigation. For example, in Rouverol v. Commissioner, a 1964 decision, the Tax
Court held that a transfer of the exclusive rights in one field of use qualified
for section 1235 treatment (i.e., constituted a transfer of all substantial rights
in that field). 278 Five years later, in Fawick v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
279
The Sixth Circuit, however, soon
followed its earlier decision in Rouvero.
280
reversed the Tax Court's Fawick decision. A few years later, the Ninth Cir281
cuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit in Mros v. Commissioner. In a more
recent case, Spiereas v. Commissioner, the Third Circuit affirmed a Tax
Court decision holding that a transfer that dealt with only the pharmaceutical
field of use (and not other fields of use) did not qualify for capital asset treatment under section 1235.282
In our opinion, field-of-use limitations can be compared to geographical
limitations, discussed above. Neither should be fatal in obtaining section
277

Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(iii); Mros v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g3

0

T.C.M. (CCH) 519, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 71,123 (1971) (concluding that the transfer of a patent

subject to a field-of-use restriction was not the transfer of all substantial rights to the patent). If a
patent is limited to a field of use, one issue that arises is whether the patent has any reasonable
application in any other field of use. A field-of-use restriction would not present a problem for
purposes of section 1235 if the restricted use was in the only industry (field) in which the patent
had value and the other requirements of section 1235 were satisfied. Compare United States v.
Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955) (concluding that a transfer limiting the transferee's right
to use a patent in the tuna industry was a transfer of all substantial rights when the patent had no
value for any purpose other than processing tuna fish) with Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d

655 (6th Cir. 1971), rev'g52 T.C. 104 (1969), nonacq., 1978-2 C.B.1 (concluding that the exclusive patent license for the marine service industry only was not a transfer of all substantial rights
to the patent when the patent had known value outside that field of use).
27 8

42

T.C. 186 (1964).

279 52 T.C. 104 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971).
280436

F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971).
F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1974).
9
282 886 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2018), ai 'g112 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, 2016 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2016163.
281493
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1235 capital asset treatment so long as the transferor has transferred the right
to make, use, and sell within that field of use. Moreover, transfers with fieldof-use limitations are beneficial to both the grantor and grantee because both
recognize that the field-of-use restrictions are useful for technology that may
contain multiple and distinct usages. 283 The grantor transfers its rights in a
particular field of use, enabling the grantee to acquire exactly what is needed
for a distinct area of technology or research. 2" In other words, transfers with
field-of-use restrictions reduce waste. Further, other scholars have noted that
a field-of-use limitation might incentivize investment in a particular niche
technology by small enterprises that do not possess the necessary resources to
"risk their startup costs if an established firm were already in the field." 2 5
Such transfers should be encouraged, not penalized, under section 1235.
Interestingly, under the general characterization provisions of the Code, a
patent transfer with a field-of-use restriction may qualify as a "sale or exchange." Indeed, prior to section 1235's enactment, courts held that transfers
of patents broken into different fields of use could enjoy capital asset treatment under general characterization principles (provided the transferors conveyed the right to make, use, and sell). 286
Unfortunately, and as noted previously, general characterization provisions of the Code no longer allow capital asset treatment for individual inventors. 2 7 The reason is because self-created patents and inventions are not
considered capital assets in their hands, a prerequisite for capital asset treatment under the general characterization rules. Section 1235 is their only path
to capital asset treatment and should, thus, be expanded to cover transfers of
patents that have been divided into different fields of use.

283

Tim Smith, Field of Use, INvESTOPEDIA (Feb 12, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/f/field_ofuse.asp [https://perma.cc/3TRL-H457] (noting that field-of-use restrictions are
"particularlyuseful for technology and scientific research that has, or may come to have, multiple,
distinct uses").
2
See id For samples of field-of-use restrictions, see Exclusive Field ofUse LicenseAgreement,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/containers/fix120/885780/000119312503078898/dex108.
htm [https://perma.cdM3EJ-HT8N] (providing the definition of "Licensed Field"); Patent LicenseAgreement with UniversityofPennsylvania, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1338
042/000119312510184678/dex106.htm [https://perma.cc/HM2S-ERQ4] (defining the "Field
of Use").
285
See Thomas C. Meyers, Field-of-UseRestrictionsas PrecompeddveElements in Patentand
Know-How LicensingAgreementsin the UnitedStates and the European Communities, 12 Nw.
J. OF INT'L L. & Bus. 364, 366 (1991).
286
See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958); Watson v. United States,
222287F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1955). Se also Estate of Laurent v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 385 (1960).
See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
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V. Conclusion
In contrast to most industrialized nations, the United States has never fully
embraced the use of exposttax incentives for R&D efforts. Instead, the chosen tax policy tool to incentivize risky R&D investments in the United States
exemplifies an ex ante incentive-the current tax credit for incremental increases in qualified R&D spending. In light of fundamental design flaws with
ex ante incentives, consideration should be given to rewarding risky R&D
investment on the back end of the innovation cycle. An appropriate framework should take into consideration the key players in the R&D landscapenot only the giant corporate entities, such as those receiving credit for the
COVID-19 vaccine, but also individual inventors who often work quietly
behind the scene on research. Because these players are often treated differently under the tax laws, different R&D tax incentives may be justified for
each. Moreover, with the new R&D tax incentives, the United States would
provide additional encouragements to innovations by individuals that may
position the country on a better footing in the current global tech war with
China, whose patent law bestows statutory remuneration to individuals based
on the employer's exploitation of an employee's patents.
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